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"GOING ONCE, GOING TWICE.. . ":
THE DUBIOUS LEGALITY AND NECESSITY
OF NORTH CAROLINA'S AUCTIONEER
LICENSE STATUTE*
ENRIQUE ARMIJO**
Calling an auction in North Carolina without a state-granted
license is illegal. More than half the states in the United States
have also criminalized unlicensed auctioneering. North Carolina
restricts who may call an auction to protect the public from
frauds. It has even gone so far as to claim the restriction applies
to online auctioneers.
The history of auctioneering, however, as manifested in a
range of self-regulatory protections developed over time to
protect actors in the state's own loose-leaf tobacco auction
markets, demonstrates the capacity of auction systems to deter
fraudulent conduct by auctioneers without legislative
intervention. In addition, state constitutional law, which protects
the individual's right to practice the trade of his choice, bars use
of the police power to limit occupational entry. And
auctioneering's status as an expressive occupation raises free
speech concerns with imposing a prior restraint on who can
speak (or more precisely, be paid to speak) in such a manner.
Finally, criminal fraud and common law tort and contract
actions have long served to protect bidders wronged by
fraudulent auctioneers or sellers.
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Given the many incentives to act honestly during auctions
for goods, the legitimate constitutional concerns an auctioneer
licensing requirement raises, and the effectiveness and
availability of buyer-side ex post remedies, an ex ante, state-
imposed limitation on auction calling is both legally suspect and
practically unnecessary.
Auctions produce, from their very nature, the Gross Fraud of
Fictitious Biddings; ... Who does not believe that persons are
sent by owners of goods ... to raise the price on the ignorant and
the unwary? Where is the buyer who is not convinced that many
Auctioneers, while they are selling goods, make fictitious bidding
themselves, to obtain higher prices for their employers?
Letter, "Reasons Why The Present System of Auctions Ought
To Be Abolished"'
Now is the season and the day thereof when the clarion tones of
the auctioneer is heard throughout the land, and the busy buyer
looks wise as he buries his nose deep into the fragrant weed and
winks his other eye half a cent's worth.... Now comes the wary
pinhooker, and speaks softly to the chuckling farmer, and each
"does" the other, and each is satisfied, and both are stuck.
Southern Tobacconist and Manufacturers Record2
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INTRODUCTION
In his book, Auctions: The Social Construction of Value, Charles
Smith lists the "striking potpourri" of objects, otherwise having
nothing in common, that are likely to be sold at auction, ranging from
"a portrait by Rembrandt" to "ten tons of freshly caught haddock" to
a lot of "slightly damaged digital watches" to "a fairly worn antique
Caucasian scatter rug" to "a pair of Imelda Marcos's shoes."3 One
3. CHARLES W. SMITH, AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE 1
(1989).
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could add many more items to the list, such as a late-1800s mahogany
barrister's bookcase, a Civil War-era Calvary saber, or a shoebox-full
of ceramic imitation Hummel figurines. Though Smith is undoubtedly
correct that auctions serve as the method of conveyance of title for
items from the unique to the mundane, with values from millions to
pennies, this miscellany of objects shares a subsidiary commonality as
well: if the sale took place in North Carolina or one of nearly thirty
other states, it is highly likely that the auctioneer who sold these and
countless other goods was required to be licensed by the government.
For forty years, calling an auction without a license in North
Carolina has been a misdemeanor.' The State exercises its police
power in this manner, it argues, to protect a particularly susceptible
public from frauds.' The claim is a longstanding one: the "very
nature" of soliciting bids for the sale of goods, as the first epigraph
above argues, encourages a range of auctioneer-side fraudulent
conduct, from false bids to phantom bidders to misrepresentations of
value and quality. And the emergence of online auctions has drawn
the attention of licensing entities in several states, with some going so
far as to argue that an eBay seller from another state advertising
goods for sale without a license is violating the law.6
Even if such misconduct is inherent to auctions, however, both
law and practice, here in North Carolina and elsewhere, have long
taken steps to alleviate it.' In fact, the agricultural history of our own
state provides a telling example of the self-regulatory capacity of
auction markets to deter frauds. From the mid-to-late 1800s to the
early 1900s, the buyers, growers, auctioneers, warehousemen, and
local boards of trade involved in tobacco auctioneering developed a
host of self-regulatory practices intended to ensure that transactions
were as free of frauds as possible.' The most important of these
practices-a pre-sale inspection right for potential bidders-continues
today as a powerful deterrent against possible frauds committed by
auctioneers.' In addition, the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
recognition of the state constitution's protections for occupational
freedom, the freedom of speech considerations as set out by the
United States Supreme Court in its commercial speech case law, and
the long-standing efficacy of criminal fraud and private causes of
4. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
6. See infra Part II.C.2.
7. See infra Part IV.B-C.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Parts I, IV.A.1, and IV.B.
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action in common law tort to remediate auction-related wrongs,
collectively establish that a licensing requirement for auctioneers is
both legally dubious and unnecessary.o
Accordingly, the protections granted by the right to pre-bid
inspection, combined with (i) the constitutional concerns raised by
occupational licensing, (ii) existing economic and social self-
regulation against fraud at auctions, including the need for both
buyers and auctioneers to convey accurate information concerning
the good for sale, and (iii) the effectiveness of both criminal fraud law
and private rights of action to safeguard bidders' rights, all call into
question whether a licensure requirement for auctioneers is a proper,
necessary, or effective use of the state's police power. This Article
argues the answer is no.
Part I of the Article focuses, by way of a detailed example of how
auctions self-regulate, on historical and professional customs
associated with tobacco auctioneering. Given North Carolina's deep
ties to tobacco production and sale, Part I provides a historical
overview of the agricultural and economic history of tobacco auctions
to show how the auction process contains inherent incentives on all
sides to deter fraudulent conduct. Part II discusses North Carolina's
auctioneering statute and the role of the Auctioneer Licensing Board
in the statute's implementation. This Part also examines the Licensing
Board's efforts to apply the statute to online auctions directed at
prospective North Carolina buyers. Part III analyzes the statute's
legality given, inter alia, the North Carolina Constitution's right for
individuals to "enjoy the fruits of their own labor" and First
Amendment protections for auctioneer speech. Part IV considers the
inherent disadvantages to fraudulent auctioneering, as evidenced by
economic and sociological auction theory. It also reviews the history
and efficacy of criminal fraud protections for buyers, as well as fraud-
based causes of action in common law tort and contract law that have
long protected the rights of buyers and sellers in auction markets.
I. TOBACCO AUCTIONS: OCCUPATIONAL CUSTOMS AS SELF-
REGULATION
No interaction around the sale of a commodity is more ingrained
in North Carolina's history, or more colorful, than the loose-leaf
tobacco auction. The rolling, rhythmic chants of the auctioneer;
across the large piles of loose tobacco from him, the line of buyers,
raising fists, grunting, winking, and nodding their bids as they finger
10. See infra Parts III-IV.
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through the leaf pile; the sun casting wide beams of dusted light into
the warehouse through large windows in the roof; and, of course, the
sweet smell of the cured crop.
This bustling, seemingly ad hoc, and fairly chaotic process was
actually the result of decades of collaboration, negotiation, and
conflict, in which actors in the tobacco market developed, refined,
and embedded into the sales system a range of techniques and
practices to deter frauds, misrepresentations, and restraints on trade.
And these practices remain evident in most modern auctions for
goods." As demonstrated below, modifications to the tobacco auction
system illustrate a process of self-regulation and articulate a cultural
history of the region. There is much to learn about how auctions are
conducted today, and how fraud is deterred in those auctions without
regulatory intervention's heavy hand, by revisiting the North Carolina
tobacco barns of the 1800s and 1900s.
A. From Sealed Barrel Sales to Loose-Leaf Auctions
The loose-leaf auction system that formed such a large part of
North Carolina's agricultural economy came into prominence as a
response to seller-side frauds in tobacco sales. Prior to the 1850s,
growers brought tobacco to sale in large sealed wooden barrels, or
"hogsheads."12 Hogshead packing initially developed due to
challenges associated with moving large amounts of tobacco crop long
distances from farms to sale sites." A hogshead was designed to be
rolled on its side behind a horse-drawn carriage. 4 As one tobacco
historian from the period described the process:
Two hickory saplings are affixed to the hogshead, for shafts by
boring an auger-hole through them to receive the gudgeons or
pivots, in the manner of a field rolling-stone ... [wood pins
affixed to the sapling rails are then] driven a considerable
depth into the solid [packed] tobacco."
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See E.R. BILLINGS, TOBACCO: ITS HISTORY, VARIETIES, CULTURE,
MANUFACTURE AND COMMERCE 73 (1875); JOHN VAN WILLIGEN & SUSAN C.
EASTWOOD, TOBACCO CULTURE: FARMING KENTUCKY'S BURLEY BELT 161 (1998).
13. See VAN WILLIGEN & EASTWOOD, supra note 12, at 161.




The pre-loose-leaf era: "Carrying tobacco to market."
Credit: E.R. Billings, "Tobacco: Its Culture, Manufacture, & Use," p. 73.
What began as a transport-related convenience, however, soon
became a vehicle for trickery. When filling their hogsheads, sellers
developed the practice of "nesting," or packing tobacco in a hogshead
in a manner that placed high-quality tobacco leaves on top and
poorer-quality crop-or even material such as tobacco stalks, tree
leaves, or other debris-deep inside the hogshead. 6 Merchants at
auction, who could not tear apart a packed hogshead to inspect its
inner contents prior to purchase, were the scheme's marks.17 A buyer
would often purchase what was characterized by the seller as top-
grade tobacco, only to open the hogshead and find starch or rail
spikes inside."
A number of laws were passed in an attempt to safeguard
tobacco buyers from nesting planters. For example, from 1619 to
1785, southern colonies passed several laws to protect merchants from
buying or trading nested tobacco. 19 One such law established an
inspection system, soon adopted widely across tobacco markets,
whereby nominally independent inspectors appointed by the colonial
leadership would pass judgment on the quality of hogsheads brought
for sale.20 The inspector's grade would then establish the hogshead's
16. See RICHARD B. TENNANT, THE AMERICAN CIGARETTE INDUSTRY: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 211 (1971); Wilbur Wright Yeargin, Jr.,
The History of the Tobacco Auction System and the Tobacco Auctioneer 6, 10 (1989)
(unpublished M.A.L.S. thesis, Duke University) (on file with North Carolina Collection,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
17. See TENNANT, supra note 16, at 211.
18. See id.; Yeargin, supra note 16, at 6, 10.
19. Yeargin, supra note 16, at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7.
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sale price.21 This process generally took place in inspection rooms,
outside of the presence of bidders for the same crop; growers would
simply present an inspector-provided "tobacco note" to support their
stated price at market.22 The inspector's influence was all-
encompassing; as one contemporary agricultural historian described
it:
When the inspectors have procured specimens of the [tobacco
for sale from the hogshead], it follows to pronounce their
judgment; a sentence, indeed, which is of no small importance
to the crop-master, the fate of whose whole year's employment
is now brought to the test of official opinion; and it rests [with
the inspector and his assistant] alone to say (in effect) whether
he merits pay for his labor or not."
Government-appointed inspectors who were granted statutory
power to set prices soon proved themselves too amenable to bribes
from growers.2 4 Concerns over nesting and distrust of the ethically
dubious government inspectors, however, cracked open the
hogsheads permanently.' In response to perceived unfairness on the
inspectors' part, some buyers began sending representatives to
inspection stations during the tobacco season to try to ensure a fairer
transaction, taking greater initiative to personally examine the
tobacco on which they planned to bid, and pushing sellers to allow
them to do so.26 By 1810, buyers, as a matter of practice, began
personally inspecting hogsheads after they had been opened, and
planters began selling to those buyers directly.2 7 Most importantly, by
the 1820s, private auctioneers and warehouse owners began
advertising their services for hire to planters as work-arounds to
21. Id.; see also TENNANT, supra note 16, at 211.
22. WILLIAM TATHAM, AN HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL ESSAY ON THE CULTURE
AND COMMERCE OF TOBACCO (1800), reprinted in G. MELVIN HERNDON, WILLIAM
TATHAM AND THE CULTURE OF TOBACCO 1, 74-75, 80-81 (1969).
23. Id. at 76.
24. See G. MELVIN HERNDON, WILLIAM TATHAM AND THE CULTURE OF TOBACCO
435 (1969) ("[L]ax and sometime corrupt inspections resulted in the decline of the
reputation of the inspectors and the tobacco note, and careful buyers began to demand
that the tobacco be re-inspected."). But see TATHAM, supra note 22, at 73 ("It is an office
of high trust and importance in trade; and to the great credit of the institution, it has
scarcely produced an instance of corruption.").
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circumvent the tainted inspector system.' The first to do so was H.B.
Montague of Richmond, Virginia, who advertised himself in the
Richmond Inquirer as an "Independent Tobacco Auctioneer, one of
integrity."2 9 Granting control over the sale to a third party who,
though a fiduciary to the selling grower, was nominally independent
had obvious appeal to tobacco buyers. Planters also eventually came
to prefer the auction method for marketing their crops over an
inspector-set sales price, as it arrogated responsibility from the
government appointee and permitted the planter to procure the best
possible value for his crop at the fastest rate.
By the 1850s, the "loose leaf" style of sale, in which planters
presented their crops in large, loosely hand-woven bales instead of
sealed barrels, began to take hold in Virginia and North Carolina.
An open bale permitted buyers to inspect the entirety of a yield in
preparing their bids and making their internal valuations 32-a
necessity when bidding against other prospective buyers.
Moving from sale-by-the-hogshead to loose-leaf auctions granted
significant fraud protections to prospective buyers. First, as noted,
loose-leaf auctioneering helped buyers "to eliminate chances of
paying for a quality which did not measure up to the sample drawn
[from a hogshead]," and gave them the "opportunity to examine
[their] prospective purchases under more favorable conditions."33
Under the loose-leaf auction system, "the work of examining the
tobacco and determining its value became the responsibility of the
buyer, not a government inspector." 34 Since prospective buyers were
able to inspect tobacco themselves, government inspectors became
redundant, reducing opportunities for seller/inspector collusion as to
quality and price.
The auction system had significant advantages for growers as
well. As hogsheads fell into disuse, growers' packing time decreased
28. See JOSEPH CLARKE ROBERT, THE TOBACCO KINGDOM: PLANTATION,
MARKET, AND FACTORY IN VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA, 1800-1860, at 99-100
(1965).
29. BILLY YEARGIN, NORTH CAROLINA TOBACCO: A HISTORY 53 (2008) (emphasis
added).
30. See BARBARA HAHN, MAKING TOBACCO BRIGHT: CREATING AN AMERICAN
COMMODITY, 1617-1937, at 110 (2011); TILLEY, supra note 2, at 199-200.
31. See Yeargin, supra note 16, at 28-31.
32. See id.
33. TILLEY, supra note 2, at 199-200.
34. HAHN, supra note 30, at 110.
35. See JONATHAN WATTS HULL, TOBACCO IN TRANSITION: A SPECIAL SERIES
REPORT OF THE SOUTHERN LEGISLATIVE CONFERENCE 7-8 (2002).
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accordingly. 6 And because auctions took place more often than did
sales under the old hogshead/government inspection system, the new
process enabled growers to market their crops in an easier form at
more convenient times.37 By shortening the harvesting season and
thereby adding more regular opportunities at market, the auction
system also increased grower control over supply and sales.38
Eliminating opportunities for fraud, which had persisted under the
hogshead and inspection system, thus permitted tobacco to be sold
fairly and at a better informed price.
B. The Roles of the Auctioneer and Warehouseman
1. Development of Auctioneering as Expressive Activity
Though the private auctioneer first emerged as an independent
middleman who could facilitate fairer prices for tobacco, he soon
became the most integral part of the marketing of the grower's crop.
By developing a unique system of calling bids and prices, auctioneers
created attention and excitement for planters eager to make quick
sales. The father of the modern-day tobacco auctioneer was Chiswell
Dabney "Chillie" Langhorne, a cousin of Mark Twain.3 9 Langhorne
pioneered the rapid-fire, "gobble-gobble" auction call, which he
"modeled after [a] gregorian chant of a Catholic Priest" he had heard
"while attending Mass with a friend in Richmond."4 0 Langhorne
imposed a faster staccato rhythm into the priest's melodic chanting
pattern and interspersed it with his own comic patter in inventing the
gobble-gobble.41
Langhorne would later go on to make his fortune in railroad
construction (and to sire Lady Nancy Astor, who married into the
Waldorf-Astoria family and became the first woman to sit as a
Conservative Member of Parliament in the House of Commons42),
but his influence on the art and craft of auction calling was arguably
his most indelible accomplishment. 43 As auctioneers used
36. See Charles E. Gage, Historical Factors Affecting American Tobacco Types and
Uses and the Evolution of the Auction Market, 11 AGRIC. HIST. 43, 56 (1937).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Yeargin, supra note 16, at 50-51.
40. Id. at 50.
41. See id.
42. See Courtney Wilson, "Our Nancy": The Story of Nancy Astor and Her Gift to the
University of Virginia, U. VA., http://xroads.virginia.edul-MAO4/ranger/astor-Collection
/ournancy.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
43. See Yeargin, supra note 16, at 50.
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Langhorne's innovations as a base to develop their own styles, buyers
wanted in on the fun and developed a range of expressive ways to
signal their bids, such as winking, nodding, laying a finger on the side
of their noses, silently opening and closing their mouths, and sticking
out their tongues.44 The customs of call-and-bid eventually became so
refined that by the 1930s, some tobacco warehouses averaged about
360 sales per hour.45 According to one historian, "scarcely ten
minutes elapsed between the actual sale" at auction and "delivery of
payment to the seller."46
Interior of Loose-leaf Auction Warehouse, Wilson, N.C.
Credit: N.C. Collection, Southern Historical Collection, UNC-Chapel
Hill.
Tobacco chanting was an expressive process, an act rooted "in
many areas of history, including religion and social rituals" as well as
more conventional marketing techniques. 47 Drawing upon this
history, auctioneers constantly borrowed techniques from one
another. For example, in June 1937, George Washington Hill, Jr., son
and namesake of the president of the American Tobacco Company,
44. See JOSEPH C. ROBERT, THE STORY OF TOBACCO IN AMERICA 194 (1949);
Nicole Edwards Mallay, The Sound That Sells: The Musical and Improvisatory Practices
of the American Auctioneer 214 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Iowa), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3083&context=etd.
45. ROBERT, supra note 44, at 194.
46. TILLEY, supra note 2, at 205.
47. BILLY YEARGIN, REMEMBERING NORTH CAROLINA TOBACCO 40 (2008).
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used a warehouse chant he had heard earlier that season in a radio
advertisement. 48 Furthermore, auctioneers also played an increasingly
critical role in marketing tobacco outside of calling sales and
accepting bids. Not only did their infectious auction calling prod
bidders to participate, auctioneers also chanted outside warehouses in
between auctions to attract passing growers to sell their yields
inside. 49 The auctioneer thus became an integral part of advertising
crop for sale-more important than the newspaper advertisements
that provided advance notice of those sales.
2. The Warehouseman, a Fair-Dealing, "Wide-Awake" Middleman
The warehouseman, a warehouse owner or manager who
brokered the relationship between auctioneer and grower and
charged the grower a fee for his services, also marketed himself to
growers as evening the playing field between rural growers and
sophisticated buyers. Chief Justice Hughes described the role of the
warehouseman, as well as the loose-leaf auction process generally, in
Townsend v. Yeomans:
After the tobacco has been cured and is ready for the market,
the grower grades it as best he can and the resulting "piles" of
loose leaves are placed in sheets which are then tied and the
tobacco is so transported to the selected warehouse for sale.
Auction sales are held daily during five days of the week, and in
any particular warehouse as often as sufficient tobacco
accumulates. It is essential that there be present the
warehouseman, an auctioneer and other skilled help, and one
set of buyers. The warehouseman makes the opening bid....
[T]he bidding continues until the sale is announced. The grower
or other owner may turn down the sale and in such case he may
hold the tobacco for a later sale or remove it. After the sale has
been completed, the tobacco is delivered to the purchaser who
removes it from the floor. The purchaser has it reweighed and
pays the warehouseman. The warehouseman then pays the
seller the purchase price, less warehouse charges."
A well-run warehouse stocked with a "set of buyers," to use
Chief Justice Hughes's phrase, gave the grower the fairest price, as
free as possible of the frauds that plagued the old system.s2 Though
48. ROBERT, supra note 44, at 193.
49. Id. at 193-94.
50. 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
51. Id. at 445.
52. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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the warehouseman was in effect an agent of the grower, he pitched
himself as a fair dealer and an extra set of eyes that would protect all
parties involved." The Wilson Tobacco Warehouse's first newspaper
advertisement, which ran in The Wilson Mirror on September 3, 1890,
advertised the warehouse's opening as "presided over by the genial
Ed Pace, one of the best, widest awake, and most active tobacco
warehouse managers in the whole country."S4 Five thousand people
were expected to be on hand and "take part in the sales and eat the
barbecue and the trimmings that will be provided by [the]
warehouse's wide awake and liberal and generous merchants."" And
if buyers and sellers still did not get the message that Pace's
warehouse staff were diligent to potential shenanigans, the
advertisement reiterated a third time that the warehouse's "people
[would be] fully aroused and wide awake."S6 Accordingly, a deft
auctioneer, a watchful warehouseman, and a busy warehouse secured
growers fair prices as well as high ones. Some even attribute the city
of Wilson's nickname of "Wide-Awake Wilson" to claims of fair-
dealing made by local businessmen during the tobacco auction era."
An auctioneer's being perceived as fair was essential to the success of
the loose-leaf system and to the confidence both buyers and sellers
had in the integrity of the sale.
Indeed, as Mr. Pace's advertisement implied, much of the
warehouseman's efforts at grower assurance were a direct response to
the power imbalance between buyers and sellers. As one historian of
the period wrote:
[Once the grower loads his tobacco and drives it to market,]
[h]e goes alone and blind into a market in which the buyers are
experts backed by giant corporations or even by foreign
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
54. Hugh Buckner Johnston, Tobacco Marketing Came to Wilson via its Defunct
Cemetery: A Contemporary Account of the Opening of the First Warehouse in 1890 for
the Auction of Tobacco (unpublished manuscript) (on file with North Carolina Collection,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. PETER BENSON, TOBACCO CAPITALISM: GROWERS, MIGRANT WORKERS, AND
THE CHANGING FACE OF A GLOBAL INDUSTRY 69, 76 (2012); see also J. ROBERT
BOYKIN III, HISTORIC WILSON: IN VINTAGE POSTCARDS 9 (2003) ("Wilson's past
slogans have included . . . 'Wide-Awake Wilson' .... ).
58. Robert Gary Branch, Sr., The Structure of the Tobacco Auction: A Sociological
Analysis 84 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with
the U.S. Dep't of Agric. Nat'l Agric. Library) ("In the allocation of sales, [the auctioneer]
must maintain the buyers' good will and confidence in his fairness. Unhappy, disgruntled
buyers are not open-handed in their bidding.").
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governments. He sells a hundred pounds or so at a time to men
who think in terms of averages for millions of pounds. He sells
the product of more than a year of labor and worry to men who
pause some ten seconds at each basket, appraising, bidding on,
and buying, a one man crop of perhaps 2,000 pounds in not
more than three minutes.... It is purely a buyer's market ... .
In addition, though the more frequent sales under the auction
system increased grower leverage, the warehouse system preserved a
number of structural advantages held by bidders. "[L]imiting sales to
open on particular days in particular markets gave buyers more
control over leaf prices,"' and under the loose-leaf system the real
fraud threat was not misrepresentations by sellers or their
auctioneers, but rather collusion among buyers traveling together
from warehouse to warehouse-"follow[ing] sale," to use the industry
term.6 1 Buyers following sale, who often stayed at the same hotels and
shared communal fish fries and barbecues between auctions,62
enjoyed a camaraderie that would have made Adam Smith nod in
knowing recognition:
Buyers from the major and the lesser tobacco manufacturers,
representatives of foreign buyers, brokers and petty speculators
(the "pin-hookers" who buy undervalued mixed lots which they
quickly re-sort and resell) visit warehouses in a group. Such a
group, known as a set, moves from one warehouse to another in
scheduled rotation."1
The auction warehouse system also made it easier for growers to
comply with a number of post-Civil War laws passed by the federal
59. SAMUEL THOMAS EMORY, BRIGHT TOBACCO IN THE AGRICULTURE,
INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN TRADE OF NORTH CAROLINA 83, 85 (1939); see also
ANTHONY J. BADGER, PROSPERITY ROAD: THE NEW DEAL, TOBACCO, AND NORTH
CAROLINA 18-21 (1980) (arguing that growers were at a structural disadvantage
compared to buyers, which was compounded by the auction warehouse system); John
Hanna, Agricultural Cooperation in Tobacco, 1 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 292, 298 (1934)
(noting growers' "weak economic position" and "particularly weak" bargaining power
against tobacco manufacturing companies during the marketing process).
60. HAHN, supra note 30, at 207 n.21.
61. See MAURICE DUKE & DANIEL P. JORDAN, TOBACCO MERCHANT: THE STORY
OF UNIVERSAL LEAF TOBACCO COMPANY 85 (1995).
62. ROBERT, supra note 44, at 196.
63. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1910) (1776) ("People of the same
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends
in ... some contrivance to raise prices.").




government, in particular the Tariff and Internal Revenue Law of
June 6, 1872,65 which called for imposing a sales tax on tobacco sales. 66
In response, warehousemen adverted to growers that their
auctioneers would provide itemized bills of sale. Just days after the
legislation was passed, one warehouse in Danville, Virginia fired off a
letter to the "Planters of Virginia and N. Carolina" noting that "[a]ny
farmer selling at our Warehouse, after the first of July next, need only
carry home with him and preserve the statement of sales furnished by
us, and he will be always prepared to answer the inquiries of the
United States officials, promptly and with accuracy."67 By providing
hard-copy records of amount, quality, and price, these bills of sale
also increased confidence in the tobacco auctioning system.6 A
survey of warehousemen and farmers conducted by a University of
Kentucky graduate student during 1919's crop reported that both
parties were satisfied with the warehouse auction system."
C. Formal Self-Regulation: The Boards of Trade
Despite advances in the marketing and sale of tobacco,
fraudulent practices lingered. Some warehouse owners or their
representatives became known as "drummers" due to their practice
of spending much of the growing offseason, and even in some cases
the growing months, drumming up growers to sell at their
warehouses." These drummers occasionally engaged in frauds such as
purporting to guarantee higher sale prices than other houses could
deliver or promising "first sales," whereby the drummer told several
growers that their crop would be sold earliest in the day and thus the
grower would not have to wait around the warehouse for his sale.n
Growers were increasingly interrupted in their work by visiting
drummers bearing these false promises.7
In response to such practices (as well as to the specter of
potential federal regulation 73), growers established their own local
and state-wide boards of trade intended to restrict or end drumming.
For example, in 1903, the Virginia-Carolina Warehouse Association
65. Act of June 6, 1872, ch. 315, § 31, 17 Stat. 230,249-55.
66. See TILLEY, supra note 2, at 202.
67. Id. (quoting Broadside from Neal Brothers, Operators of Planter's Warehouse
(June 20, 1872)).
68. See id.
69. ROBERT, supra note 44, at 201.
70. See Yeargin, supra note 16, at 41-42.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
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passed a series of resolutions to that effect, and other boards began
developing additional rules to promote fair play.74 Boards established
"committees for arbitrating disputes, regulating the order of sales,....
and handling numerous other vexatious questions" concerning
warehouse operations and in the process "promulgat[ed] reforms and
improvements."75 Boards also "create[d] and enforce[d] agreements
regarding fees and qualities and prices" and "exerted powerful
pressure in mediating markets between buyers and sellers."76
Additionally, in July 1934, Congress sought to pass an onerous
bill that would have licensed warehousemen and slowed the sale of
auctions.77 Boards of trade responded by agreeing to a self-regulatory
code that, inter alia, limited the speed of auction selling to 375 lots
per hour, allowed growers up to fifteen minutes to reject final bids,
and outlawed speculation by warehousemen. Even at the height of
the New Deal's intervention into agricultural markets, federal grading
for tobacco sold at auction was imposed via the Tobacco Inspection
Act79 only if two-thirds of growers selling at a particular warehouse
voted in favor." The board of trade system and the attendant codes of
conduct promulgated by individual boards thus became fully
integrated into the regulation of tobacco sales."1 The pervasive
influence of the boards of trade demonstrated that auction markets
were able to self-regulate, as well as protect buyers from fraud,
without governmental interventions.82 Occupational custom and
contract law were a means to avoid unnecessary state control.
74. See TILLEY, supra note 2, at 228-30, 289-90; Yeargin, supra note 16, at 41-42.
75. TILLEY, supra note 2, at 250.
76. HAHN, supra note 30, at 119-20.
77. See BADGER, supra note 59, at 105-06.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Tobacco Inspection Act, ch. 623, § 5, 49 Stat. 731, 732 (1935) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 511d (2006)).
80. Id.; see also BADGER, supra note 59, at 210. Boards of trade did occasionally
overstep their bounds in attempting to protect their members' share of the tobacco
market. See, e.g., Kinston Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 235 N.C.
737, 740, 71 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1952) (rejecting a board's attempt to require the defendant to
bid at an end-of-season auction, deeming such a demand as "revolutionary in principle
[that] strikes at the heart of our system of free enterprise"); Bright Belt Warehouse Ass'n
v. Tobacco Planters Warehouse, Inc., 231 N.C. 142, 147, 56 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1949)
(rejecting a board's attempt to enjoin a warehouse from holding sales when a minimum
number of buyers would not be present).
81. See HAHN, supra note 30, at 119, 169 (noting that when the federal government
created a regulatory scheme during the Great Depression, "local boards of trade
submitted their standards" to the government and thus the "government could take its
cues from established market structures").




The history and development of tobacco auctions show that
sellers and auctioneers consistently acted, in the absence of
government interference, to minimize frauds. Doing so was in their
immediate interest, as it ensured a well-functioning and reliable
market for their crop, and their long-term interest, as auctioneers that
were perceived as fair-dealing could be counted on to solicit more
bids in future sales, thereby raising sales and prices over time.
After reviewing North Carolina's auctioneer licensing statute
and its legality, this Article next shows how the protections present in
southern tobacco barns in the 1800s and 1900s continue to protect
bidders from fraud today.
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S AUCTIONEERING STATUTE
The primary practices of auctioneers, sellers, and bidders in the
tobacco auction system that protected against fraud-a right to pre-
bid inspection, an auctioneer transparently providing initial
valuations and running sales, and post-fraud recourse-are present in
modern-day auctions, regardless of the particular goods up for bid. As
discussed in Parts III and IV below, these practices operate to this
day in modern auction systems to deter frauds. However, an
auctioneer's skill at drumming up bids is no longer the sole
determinant of his ability to earn his keep. As discussed below, and in
the name of consumer protection, the State has seen fit to pass
judgment on the auctioneer's qualifications to take up the trade.
A. Auction Licenses: Their Grant and Revocation
The North Carolina Auctioneers Law" (the "Law") was passed
in 1973.' It requires individuals conducting auctions to be licensed by
the State.85 Twenty-six states have similar bars on auctioneering
without a license, 86 at least some of which were passed around the
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 85B-1 to -9 (2011).
84. Act of May 17, 1973, ch. 552, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 863 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 85B-1 to -9 (2011)).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-4.
86. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2C-2 (LexisNexis 2007) ("After the thirtieth day of
June, one thousand nine hundred seventy-four, no person shall conduct an auction as an
auctioneer in this State unless he shall have first obtained from the commissioner a license
therefor."); see also ALA. CODE § 34-4-20 (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-17-
105 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.385 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-6-9 (2011); 225
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 407/10-1 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-6.1-3-2 (LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330.030 (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:3101 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 285 (Supp. 2012); MASS. ANN.
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same time." Eleven other states limit the auctioning of certain
property without a license" or delegate licensing authority to a
municipality in the state." Though there is little legislative history
surrounding the Law's passage, according to one source, in the 1970s
and 80s, voluntary state auctioneer associations around the country
actively lobbied their respective legislatures for a statutory licensing
requirement. 90  The North Carolina Auctioneers Licensing
Commission, the entity created by the Law to enforce it,9' states that
the Law "establishes specific standards of conduct that serve to
protect the public."9 2 The Commission also states that "[1]icensing
auctioneers and auction businesses increases public confidence in the
profession by providing a means of determining the ability, general
knowledge, integrity, and good character of those permitted to
practice, and a means of deterring fraudulent or dishonest dealings
and unethical conduct." 9 3 Likewise, other states' licensing statutes
that include a statement of purpose find, for example, that
"unqualified auctioneers and apprentices and unreliable auction
LAWS ch. 100, § 2 (LexisNexis 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-4-5 (West 2010); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 343.010 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-887.02 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311-B:4 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-05.1-01 (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4707.02(A) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012); 63 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 734.3 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-58-1 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-6-250 (2011);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-19-102 (2009); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1802.051 (West 2012);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 4603 (2006 & Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-603 (2009 &
Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.11.070 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 480.08
(West 2012).
87. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 5, 1973, No. 811, §§ 3, 19, 1973 Ala. Acts 1236 (codified at
ALA. CODE § 34-4-20 (LexisNexis 2010)); Act of Mar. 11, 1975, § 1, 1975 Ga. Laws 53
(codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 43-6-9 (2011)); Act of Apr. 8, 1975, ch. 449, § 1,
1975 N.D. Laws 1238 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-05.1-01 (2007)); Act
of Apr. 13, 1973, ch. 11, 1973 W. Va. Acts 112 (codified at W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19-2C-2
(LexisNexis 2007)).
88. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1672 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1016 (2005);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:17-4 to 17-5 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-16-5 (West 2009);
OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 59, § 983 (West 2010).
89. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-51-101 to 12-51-102 (West 2012) (authorizing
counties to license public auctioneers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-1 (West 2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 446.51 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 330.01(a) (West
2011); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 136 (McKinney 2004), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-34-7 (2004).
90. Auctioneer Licensing-The Debate, AUCTION LAW (Dec. 25, 2011, 5:59 PM),
http://auctionlaw.wordpress.com/2Oll/12/25/auctioneer-licensing-the-debate/. This theory
is borne out by the dates of passage of several state statutes. See session laws cited supra
note 87.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05, 110-14.
92. What We Do, N.C. AUCTIONEER LICENSING BOARD, http://www.ncalb.org
/whatwedo.cfm (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
93. Id.
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businesses present a significant threat to the public," 94 or that the
statute is necessary in "order to prevent fraud, deception, and
misrepresentation upon the buying public.""
The Law defines an "Auction" as
the sale of goods or real estate by means of exchanges between
an auctioneer and members of an audience, the exchanges
consisting of a series of invitations for offers made by the
auctioneer, offers by members of the audience, and the
acceptance by the auctioneer of the highest or most favorable
offer. 96
An "Auctioneer" for the Law's purposes is an individual who
conducts such auctions.97 Relatedly, "Auctioneering" includes, "in
addition to the actual calling of bids," inter alia, "[a]dvertising an
auction," "[o]ffering items for sale at auction," "[a]ccepting payment
or disbursing monies for items sold at auction," and "[o]therwise
soliciting" an auction, or "holding oneself out as an auctioneer or
auction firm."98
The Law requires any Auctioneer conducting a nonexempt
Auction to hold a license.9 9 Among other requirements, to be licensed
as an Auctioneer, a person must be eighteen years old or older, have
graduated from high school, and not have pled guilty to or been
convicted of a felony or "any act involving fraud or moral
turpitude."'o To be granted an auctioneer license, an applicant must
have either served as a licensed "apprentice auctioneer" for two years
prior to application or undertaken eighty hours of classroom
instruction in approved courses on topics such as "Bid Calling, Voice
Control, Proper Breathing Techniques, and Use of Sequence of
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.381 (West 2007).
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-16-3 (West 2009); see also 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
407/5-5 (West 2012) (reasoning that without legislation, the State of Illinois "does not have
the ability to evaluate the competency of persons engaged in the auction business or to
regulate this business for the protection of the public").
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-1(1) (2011). The Law exempts a limited number of
auctions, including estate sales, foreclosure sales of real property by a public authority,
sales conducted by a trustee or charitable organization, and bankruptcy-related sales. See
id. § 85B-2. Another important exception, especially in the context of online auctioneers,
is for sales of property owned by the auctioneer. See id. § 85B-2(a)(1).
97. See id. § 85B-1(2).
98. Id. § 85B-1(8).
99. Id. § 85B-4; see also id. § 85B-2(a) (listing the auctions which are deemed exempt
and thus do not require a licensed auctioneer).
100. Id. § 85B-4(b).
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Numbers,"101 as well as advertising, contract drafting, ethics, and
accounting.'0 In either case, successful passage of a written
examination is a prerequisite to the granting of a license.'03 Calling an
auction without a license is a Class 1 misdemeanor, and the Law gives
the North Carolina Auctioneers Commission" the authority to "seek
injunctive relief" to "restrain any violation or anticipated violation" of
the Law, including the calling of an auction without a license. 0 Out-
of-state auctioneers-again, a term not limited to in-person auction
callers but rather any person who "[a]ccept[s] payment ... for items
sold at auction" 06-must also be licensed. o0
Finally, the Law sets out a number of grounds for the "denial,
suspension, or revocation" of a license, as well as a civil penalty.'
The majority of these grounds are anti-fraud measures. For example,
an auctioneer can have his license revoked for "[a] continued and
flagrant course of misrepresentation or making false promises, either
by the licensee, an employee of the licensee, or by someone acting on
behalf of and with the licensee's consent," "[any false, misleading, or
untruthful advertising," "[k]nowingly using false bidders, cappers, or
pullers, or knowingly making a material false statement or
representation," "any act involving fraud or moral turpitude," or
"[a]ny act of conduct in connection with a sales transaction which
demonstrates bad faith or dishonesty."109
B. The North Carolina Auctioneers Commission
As alluded to earlier, the Law establishes an "Auctioneers
Commission," more commonly referred to as the Auctioneer
Licensing Board (the "Board"), and grants the Board the power to
administer the Law, including the issuance, denial, suspension, and
revocation of licenses."o The Board is made up of five members
appointed by the North Carolina Governor, at least three of whom
are auctioneers nominated by the Auctioneers Association of North
101. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 4B.0502(a) (2012). Other areas of instruction approved
auctioneering schools must provide include "Body Language," "Ring Work," and
"Hygiene and Personal Appearance." Id.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-4(d).
103. Id.
104. For discussion of the Auctioneers Commission, see infra Part II.B.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-9(b) (emphasis added).
106. Id. § 85B-1(8)(e).
107. Id. § 85B-5. This provision's application to online auctions is analyzed infra Part
II.C.
108. Id. § 85B-8.
109. Id. § 85B-8(a).
110. See id. § 85B-3.1.
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Carolina ("AANC")."' One seat on the Board is reserved for a non-
auctioneer "who shall represent the public at large and shall not be
licensed under this Chapter," presumably to curb the protectionist
impulses of an all-auctioneer licensing board."2 As part of its
licensing function, the Board establishes the application process,
including developing the required written examination and checking
all license applicants' criminal histories."3 It also promulgates and
approves continuing education requirements for auctioneers, and
certifies auctioneering schools after ensuring that the proposed
school's curriculum matches the Board's regulations.'14
Additionally, the Law sets up an Auctioneer Recovery Fund with
proceeds from license fees.ns Pursuant to its licensing authority, the
Board has the power to receive and investigate complaints by "[a]n
aggrieved person who has suffered a monetary loss as a direct result
of the conversion of funds or property or other fraudulent act or
conduct by a licensed auctioneer," and to grant such a person an
award from the Fund if the auctioneer is himself unable to satisfy a
fraud-related judgment against him."' In addition to this power, the
Board also has the authority, "upon its own motion or upon the
complaint in writing of any person ... [to] hold a hearing and
investigate the auctions of any auctioneer," to impose a civil penalty,
to reprimand or censure a licensee, and/or to suspend or revoke any
license."' Generally, the auctioneer has due process rights in such
proceedings; however, if "the health, safety, or welfare of the public is
at risk, such as in the event of a potential loss of consigned items or
111. Id. § 85B-3(a).
112. Id. § 85B-3(b). As the Supreme Court of North Carolina commented with respect
to another licensing board similarly composed, a government-empowered licensure body
grants to incumbent businessmen the "power of exclusion of fellow workers in the same
field" via the "discretion ... to set up standards of their own" to enter the field "according
to whatever rules or regulations they may conceive to be related" to public health or
safety. State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 752, 754, 6 S.E.2d 854, 859-60 (1940), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 180-94.
113. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-3.2. The Board can deny an applicant's license if the
records check "reveals one or more convictions of a crime that is punishable as a felony
offense, or the conviction of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude." Id. § 85B-
3.2(d).
114. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 4B.0502(a)(1)-(2) (2012). For a sampling of the Board's
required courses, see supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. The Board's regulations
also establish requirements concerning "instructor conduct and performance," including
"[t]he ability to present an effective visual image to a class by appearance and physical
mannerisms" and refraining from "criticism of any other person, agency or organization."
21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 4B.0815(b).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-4.1.
116. Id. § 85B-4.2.
117. Id. § 85B-8(e)(1).
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potential loss of funds," the Board has the power, "upon its own
motion," to "summarily suspend a license."'
C. Online Auctions
1. North Carolina's Approach to Online Auctions
The Board has intermittently sought to extend the Law's reach to
online auctions aimed at potential North Carolina bidders. In the late
1990s, both the AANC and the Board turned their focus on the rising
trend of online auctions. In October 1998, the then-general counsel
for the Board co-authored an article in The North Carolina
Auctioneer, a trade periodical published by the AANC, which first set
out the Board's stance on internet auctions." 9 In the article, he wrote,
"Internet auctions ... are no different than any other non-traditional
auction. If the bids are solicited, received, or awarded in North
Carolina, a North Carolina license is required. Period."'20 At the
November 1999 regular monthly meeting of the Board, the members
unanimously voted to approve a policy which stated:
If an individual or business is located in North Carolina and 1.
they solicit auctions; 2. contract for auctions; 3. accept
consignments for auctions; 4. advertise for auctions; 5. offer
items for sale at auctions; 6. accept payment and/or disburse
monies for items sold at auction; 7. accept bids for items that
are not their own goods; and, 8. buy goods for resale at auction
over the Internet, the minimum requirement for those
individuals or businesses is to hold a current auctioneer license
or if no live exchanges occurred, then hold an auction firm
license.121
Less than a week after the Board had clarified its internal
policies and distributed a pamphlet which laid out the changes, it was
118. Id. § 85B-8(e)(2).
119. Jeffrey P. Gray & W. Wayne Woodward, It's the Law: Non-Traditional Auctions
Continue to Cause a Stir, NORTH CAROLINA AUCTIONEER, Oct. 1998, reprinted in
ROBERT A. HAMILTON, INTERNET AUCTION ISSUES IN NORTH CAROLINA: A WRITTEN
SUMMARY PROVIDED TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC WORKSHOP
"POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFORTS TO RESTRICT COMPETITION ON THE INTERNET"
7, 7, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/hamilton.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
120. Id. at 8.
121. ROBERT A. HAMILTON, INTERNET AUCTION ISSUES IN NORTH CAROLINA: A
WRITTEN SUMMARY PROVIDED TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC
WORKSHOP "POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFORTS TO RESTRICT COMPETITION ON
THE INTERNET" 2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommercelanticompetitive
/panellhamilton.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
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contacted by local and national media, the public, and international
businesses-all requesting information about the "new law." 122 At the
Board's December 1999 meeting, likely in response to the hullabaloo
caused by the pamphlet, two North Carolina legislators asked that the
Board "defer action" on the regulation of internet auctioneers so that
the Joint Select Committee on Information Technology could have
enough time to study the issue in case the General Assembly wanted
to officially change the language of the statute.123 The request was
unanimously approved, and the Board temporarily suspended the
regulation of online transactions.124 There is no evidence that the
Joint Committee actually undertook this review; however, a bill was
introduced to the House of Representatives during the 2005 session
which would have excluded "internet-based sales" from the
Auctioneering statute.125 But after a series of revisions, the bill was
signed into law stripped of its original language pertaining to internet
sales. 126
The Board's position has changed only incrementally since the
1999 statement. In an internal newsletter written on June 30, 2009, the
then-chairman of the Board, Lloyd "Mickey" Meekins, Jr., stated that
the Board "will start as soon as possible working on Internet Auction
Regulations. These regulations will resemble those in Pennsylvania,
which subject online auctioneers to that state's licensing
requirement, 127 and will be designed to protect the public from non-
licensed auctioneers doing auction business through the Internet."128
The Board's enforcement action has been consistent with this
aggressive position; in June 2012, a journalist from the Winston-Salem
Journal wrote a story about Diane Pearce, the sole proprietor of the
company Consigning Women, who was asked by the Board to cease
122. See id. at 3.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 3-4.
125. See An Act to Exclude Internet-Based Sales from Activities Regulated by Laws
Pertaining to Auctions and Auctioneers, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 21, 2005),
http://ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUplBillLookUp.pl?Session=2005&BillID=H1388.
126. See Act of July 11, 2006, ch. 134,2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 472 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-70-5, 58-70-40, 58-70-65(c) (2011)).
127. See infra Part II.C.2.
128. Lloyd Meekins, NCALB Chairman's Corner, N.C. AUCTIONEER LICENSING
BOARD NEWSL. (N.C. Auctioneering Licensing Bd., Fuquay Varina, N.C.), June 30, 2009,
at 1, 2, available at http://www.ncalb.org/documents/Newsletter%20bi-yearly%206-30-
09.pdf.
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and desist her online business for lack of a license.129 The title of the
skeptically toned piece was "Little-known N.C. licensing board
discovers the Internet."O In it, both the journalist and Pearce express
disbelief that a regulatory board had the authority to shut her
business down.'3 1 The article describes the Board as "an obscure arm
of state government that apparently just became clued into the World
Wide Web."13 2
A recent article in the Board's November 2012 newsletter,
however, takes a more nuanced stance, perhaps in response to fall-out
from the incident described in the Winston-Salem Journal earlier that
year. The article, written by the Board's current legal counsel, Garris
Neil Yarborough, first sets out the Board's new goals with regard to
online regulation:
In interpreting our North Carolina Auctioneer Licensing Laws,
the Board has attempted to differentiate between legitimate
internet "trading platforms," payment systems, advertising
activities, and unlicensed auctioneering activities, which simply
use the internet as the medium for conducting auctions. This is
sometimes a difficult task, but through the Board's enforcement
program, we have identified several clear-cut means for
identifying violations: the easiest being identifying individuals
or businesses that are unlicensed, but use some form of the
word "auction" in their business name.133
Under the statutory definitions provided since the Law's
enactment, certain activities are inherently within the scope of
regulation, regardless of whether the medium used to carry out those
activities happens to be the internet. 3 4 According to Yarborough, the
statute was always intended to be silent when it came to the medium
over which an auction occurred; in the Board's view, it was the action
that was meant to be regulated, not the medium." As Yarborough
describes it, "[the Law] is neutral as to the medium one uses. Live
129. Scott Sexton, Little-Known N.C Licensing Board Discovers the Internet,





133. Garris Neil Yarborough, Article, N.C. AUCTIONEER LICENSING BOARD NEWSL.
(N.C. Auctioneer Licensing Bd., Fuquay Varina, N.C.), Nov. 2012, at 1-2, available at
http://www.ncalb.org/documents/Nov%202012-Vol%202%20issue%206.pdf.
134. See id. at 2.
135. Telephone Interview with Garris Neil Yarborough, Legal Counsel, N.C.
Auctioneer Licensing Bd. (Jan. 2, 2013).
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telephone, letter, etc.-it doesn't speak to the means of
communication. As far as they're concerned, if you're engaging with
certain things that engage in auctioneering, you need a license."136
Yarborough notes in the newsletter and during an interview that
the Board's current stance is to tackle this issue on a case-by-case
basis because the mechanical definitions used by the 1999 Board's
policymakers simply do not fit the current understanding of how the
internet works.' As Yarborough explains,
eBay is the telephone. It is providing the medium for the
communication. Selling your table on eBay is not auctioneering.
But if Fred's Internet Auction house solicits to take the table
and auction it off for me on the internet, it could be a
transaction for which a license was needed. Just because they
use the internet doesn't mean they don't need a license.' 8
In Yarborough's opinion, the statute does not need amending
since it already has sound definitions which cover specific actions that
the State deems important enough to regulate.'39 Because technology
changes constantly, Yarborough believes it would be foolhardy to
attempt to keep up with it by changing the statute every time a new
disruptive technology becomes widely used.1" "You can't define
murder by the weapon," he said.'41 "It makes sense to define the
crime by the activity rather than the means." 42 The current key for
Yarborough and the Board in how they regulate online auctioneers
therefore seems to be the manner in which the auctioneers hold
themselves out to the public.'43 "If we see 'auction' in the name of a
company, that is the first thing that pops up."'" According to
Yarborough, the Board receives tips from the public all the time
about various companies which are acting essentially as online
auction houses.145
136. Id.
137. Id.; Yarborough, supra note 133, at 2.
138. Telephone Interview with Garris Neil Yarborough, supra note 135. Yarborough's
interpretation here is consistent with the Law's exception for sales of property owned by
the auctioneer. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-2(a)(1) (2011).
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2. Other States' Approaches to Online Auctions
As alluded to above, other states have taken affirmative steps
either to expressly include or exempt online auctioneering from
licensing requirements. The legislative bodies in two states, Texas and
North Dakota, have explicitly removed online auctions from the
scope of their regulatory provisions.146 The legislatures of both those
states decided that online auctions were categorically different from
the types of auctions that their licensing laws intend to regulate.147
In contrast, beginning in the mid-2000s, a growing number of
states, including Illinois,148 New Hampshire,149 and Pennsylvania,o5 1
have added provisions that aim to bring online auctioneers within
statutory licensing schemes. Although the ostensible goal for these
provisions is mainly to protect the public from frauds by itinerant
auction sites, it is clear that the expansion of auctioneering statutes to
cover online transactions also supplies monetary incentives for the
state in the form of a larger take for license fees or civil penalties. For
example, New Hampshire requires all online auctioneers to
"complete a study or an apprenticeship, pass a state examination,
hold a $10,000 bond, and pay an annual $85 fee" to the state
146. See Auctioneers Frequently Asked Questions, TEX. DEP'T OF LICENSING AND
REG., http://www.tdlr.state.tx.us/auc/aucfaq.htm#127 (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) ("[Q:]
Does an online auction need a licensed auctioneer? [A:] No. The Texas Department of
Licensing and Regulation would not consider someone conducting an online auction to
need a license from this agency, since it is not 'bid calling.' The definition of 'auctioneer'
pursuant to Chapter 1802.001(5) Texas Occupations Code (Auctioneer Law) includes that
he or she act as a 'bid caller.' Online auctions do not have an auctioneer as a 'bid
caller.' "); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-05.1-04 (Supp. 2011) ("A person conducting, or
employed by a person conducting, an internet auction is not an auctioneer or clerk within
the meaning of this chapter.").
147. See Auctioneers Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 146; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 51-05.1-04.
148. See Act of May 23, 2002, P.A. 92-0797, 2002 Ill. Laws. 2730, 2731-34 (codified as
amended at 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 407/10-27 (West 2012)); see also Internet Auction
Listing Service Required to Register, ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. & PROFILING REG.,
http://www.idfpr.com/dpr/re/NEWS/IALSReg.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
149. See Act of July 13, 2010, ch. 291, 2010 N.H. Laws 476 (codified in scattered
sections of N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 311-B and 358-G (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012)); see
also Larry Theurer, Summary of Testimony for the Federal Trade Commission: Possible
Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet Workshop, FTC.GOV,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/theurer.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2013).
150. See Act of Oct. 8, 2008, No. 2008-89, §§ 2, 5, 2008 Pa. Laws 1080 (codified at 63
PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 734.2, 734.10.1 (West 2010)); see also Gene Friedman & Catherine
Saunders-Watson, New Pa. Law Requires Online Trading Assistants to be Licensed,





regulatory agency."' Though the legislature did not alter the wording
in Georgia's licensing statute with regard to online auctions, the
State's view on the issue of online auctioneers and licensing was made
clear after the Governor's Office of Consumer Protection in Georgia
took action against www.wavee.com, a penny auction website,
because state officials said that the site was operating illegally by not
being registered with the Georgia Auctioneers Commission."' The
Governor's Office ordered Wavee to pay "civil fines and penalties of
$50,000 and pay restitution of $202,210.10, a civil penalty of $35,000
and $15,000 in administrative/investigation expenses. Plus, Wavee
[paid] $50,000 to the state to establish a trust account."'53 Before
changes were made to Pennsylvania's regulatory statutes, third-party
sellers of property in timed online auctions were exempted from
obtaining an auctioneer's license.154 However, a new bill was enacted
to require these "trading assistants" to register with the state and pay
a biennial fee of $100 to the State Board of Auctioneer Examiners."s5
The online auction site eBay took significant steps to oppose
these legislative efforts. While amendments were under consideration
in Pennsylvania, eBay posted a notice on its website that the company
"oppose[d] attempts to extend state auction licensing requirements to
either eBay sellers or eBay itself."' eBay had lobbyists in as many as
twenty-five states in 2006, all working to get states to deregulate
online transactions and to prevent them from bringing eBay
151. Theurer, supra note 149, at 2.
152. Amanda Lee, The State of Georgia Shuts Down Wavee, PENNY AUCTION
WATCH, http://www.pennyauctionwatch.com/2011/07/the-state-of-georgia-shuts-down-
wavee-com-governors-office-of-consumer-protection (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). The
complaint stated:
The Administrator alleges that the Respondents have used unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer acts or
practices in trade or commerce as declared unlawful by the [Georgia consumer
protection statute]. Specifically, the Administrator alleges that Respondents have
committed the following unfair or deceptive acts or practices: A. Respondents
advertised that www.wavee.com is a "penny auction" website and conducted
thousands of auctions on this website without the authority to do so. Respondents
were not authorized to conduct such auctions because they were not registered
with the Georgia Auctioneers Commission, as required by O.C.G.A. 43-6-9.
Id.
153. Id.
154. See Friedman & Saunders-Watson, supra note 150.
155. Id.
156. Ina Steiner, Pennsylvania Latest Battleground in eBay Consignment-Sales
Regulation, ECOMMERCEBYTES (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab
/abn/y07/m04/i23/s02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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customers into the auctioneering statutes' scope.'"' eBay eventually
lost its battle with Pennsylvania, or at least decided to stop fighting. It
used to host a website which allowed concerned parties to contact
state legislatures, urging them to "speak up by opposing legislation to
regulate eBay or eBay sellers.""ss On eBay Main Street, the
company's advocacy site which lists its stances on hot button issues,
there are currently no pages that address state regulation of online
auctioneers.'"' It seems that eBay has at least impliedly accepted that
states are able to bring online transactions into their respective
licensing schemes. Ina Steiner, editor of the website
ecommercebytes.com, may have proved to be prophetic when she
said in 2006 that in the face of these legislative efforts, "eBay doesn't
have a choice."16
However, while Pennsylvania's legislature took affirmative steps
to regulate and license what it referred to as "online trading
assistants" against eBay's wishes, it also did so with some recognition
of the inherent differences between traditional and online auctions.
The sponsor of the senate bill which brought online trading assistants
into the legislative framework, Senator Rob Wonderling, remarked
on the Senate floor:
Senate Bill No. 908 seeks to remedy a situation where, today in
Pennsylvania, we have countless numbers of individuals who
derive income, whether in part or in total, making a living by
selling goods and items on Internet platforms.... We had a
situation in which there was a defect in the statute which would
have required such e-sellers, if you will, to become licensed
auctioneers in what I would describe as a traditional 20th
century model that required training. Literally, the requirement
would have been to have these folks attending Reading Area
Community College and learn how to talk fast. It does not
make sense when you are putting an item up for sale on eBay.161
157. Katie Hafner, Going Once ... Going Twice ... Gone!: How eBay Makes
Regulations Disappear, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at B.
158. See Nino, eBay Staff Member, eBay fights State Internet Auctioneering Regulation,
CHATTER NEWSL., http://pages.ebay.com/community/chatter/2005april/govtrel.html (last
visited Aug. 19, 2013).
159. See id. (clicking on the old links to eBay's list of state legislatures brings up a
"Page Not Found" alert.) Also, see eBay's old government affairs site at
http://pages.ebay.com/governmentrelations/ (clicking the "Auctioneering Regulation" tab
leads to a page on new page on Main Street). Auctioneering regulation is no longer one of
the issues listed.
160. Hafner, supra note 157.




Though Senator Wonderling's comments assumed that online
sellers would be required to be licensed in his state under current law,
he also acknowledged that traditional justifications for auctioneer
training do not apply to participation in online trading platforms,
since those sales are not made face-to-face. This is one distinction
North Carolina auctioneering regulators appear to have overlooked.
What Senator Wonderling refers to as a statutory "defect"-the idea
of forcing online sellers to undergo the same training as live
auctioneers-still appears to be policy in North Carolina.'62
3. Special Considerations for Regulating Online Auctions
According to eBay's Director of Operations, the already dubious
justifications for regulating traditional auctioneers with licensing
boards and training are even weaker for applying such standards to
online sellers. Catherine England, a spokesperson for eBay, succinctly
summed up the problems with attempting such regulation:
Since eBay and eBay sellers perform functions distinct and non-
equivalent to those of traditional auctioneers, they should not
be subject to the same regulation and licensing requirements
.... There is no evidence that imposing new regulations and
licensing requirements upon eBay or eBay sellers would
provide any additional consumer protection. However, new
regulations would impose unneeded costs and burdens upon
both buyers and sellers, many of whom rely on their eBay
transactions for their primary source of income.'63
The differences between online and live auctions, though
significant, do not call for state-imposed protections for bidders in the
online space, since online auctions have developed a host of market-
based solutions for seller-side frauds. In addition to the common law
remedies available to buyers generally, online buyers have the benefit
of additional anti-fraud measures taken by the companies providing
the online trading platforms. For example, eBay, in addition to its
ubiquitous seller rating system and guides for buyers on avoiding
scams, also permits sellers to advertise their certifications from the
buySafe bonding service, which guarantees reimbursement in the
162. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 129 (noting that the Board wanted the online seller to
"take courses to become a real, live auctioneer").
163. Ina Steiner, eBay Opposes Regulation while Pennsylvania Sellers Face Fines,
ECOMMERCEBYTES (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y07/m11
/i20/s01 (quoting Catherine England).
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event a winning bidder is defrauded.1" eBay also has an Asset
Protection Team, which handles law enforcement "eRequests" from
its customers and works to collaborate with local law enforcement
officials to track down criminals. 165 Moreover, buyers who use PayPal
for most online transactions are covered by the service's Purchase
Protection program, which reimburses defrauded buyers. 166
Accordingly, fraud is deterred in online auctions in much the
same way as it was in loose-leaf tobacco auctions. Both examples
show that where market-based processes are in place for self-
protection and are buttressed by both industry custom and contract
law, the protections nominally afforded to buyers by a licensing
regime become redundant. It makes little sense to protect a bidder
from a prospective auctioneer who might in theory act fraudulently
when there are a range of remedies available to buyers who are in fact
defrauded.
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE AUCTIONEER LICENSING STATUTE
Even with the market-based protective mechanisms described
above in the tobacco auction context but common to nearly all
modern auctions, requiring auctioneers to be licensed by the state
may, at first blush, seem like a common-sense consumer protection
measure. But the Law must be read in light of the North Carolina
Constitution's express guarantee to choose one's occupation and
protection of one's right to engage in free speech, whether that
speech be commercial or for hire.
A. The North Carolina Constitution's Right to "Enjoy the Fruits of
[One's] Labor"
1. Rational Basis Review and the "Professional"/"Ordinary Trade"
Distinction Generally
Article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, adopted
by the state's constitutional convention of 1868,161 grants the state's
164. See buySAFE Bonded on eBay, BUYSAFE, INC., https://www.buysafe.com/seller
solutions/supporting/for-ebay.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
165. See Law Enforcement eRequest System, EBAY, INC., https://lers.corp.ebay.com/
AIP/portallhome.do (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
166. See Security, PAYPAL, INC., https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/paypal-safety-
and-security (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
167. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH




citizens the right to "enjoy[] the fruits of their own labor."168 As the
Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized in an occupational
restrictions challenge, the provision borrows from the Federal
Declaration of Independence, and its drafters interpolated the
reference to "enjoyment of the fruits of [a citizen's] labor" between
the more familiar reference to "life, liberty" and "the pursuit of
happiness" from the Declaration's famous second sentence.1 9 The
court further defined the scope of "liberty" in that case to include
"the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling," and "to pursue any livelihood or vocation." 17 0
Though article I, section 1 was essentially a rider added to the
Declaration's tripartite list of inalienable rights, the North Carolina
Constitution's specific affirmation of the right to earn a living was
consistent with Founding-era thinkers' views as to the right's nature
and scope. For example, Thomas Jefferson in his essay Thoughts on
Lotteries noted that "every one has a natural right to choose for his
pursuit such one of them as he thinks most likely to furnish him
subsistence."17 1 George Mason expressed the same thought several
years earlier in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which affirmed the
Virginia Convention of Delegates' view of man's inalienable right to
"the means of acquiring" property.172 Similarly, James Madison wrote
that "a[n un]just government ... [places] arbitrary restrictions,
exemptions, and monopolies [to] deny to part of its citizens that free
use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations."173
Jefferson and Madison's view of the liberty to choose an occupation
of one's choice as a natural right, as well as their conception of the
right as a piece of other inalienable property-based rights, was
168. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
169. See State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 768, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949). The full text of
article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution reads "We hold it to be self-evident
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their
own labor, and the pursuit of happiness." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
170. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734. Similarly, though outside the scope of
this Article, the State has also declared in the context of labor relations that "[tjhe exercise
of the right to work must be protected and maintained free from undue restraints and
coercion." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-78 (2011).
171. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOUGHTS ON LOTTERIES (1826), reprinted in 17 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 448, 449 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
172. THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, reprinted in THE GEORGE MASON
LECTURES: HONORING THE TWO HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIRGINIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 20 (The Colonial Williamsburg Found. ed., 1976).
173. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS
515, 516 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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informed by John Locke, who wrote in his Two Treatises of
Government that "every man has a Property in his own Person. This
no Body has any Right but to himself. The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly His."174
North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions
interpreting article I, section 1 hew closely to the Founders'
inalienable rights language. In two typical passages, the court of
appeals stated that article I, section 1 "creates a right to . . . earn a
livelihood that is 'fundamental' for purposes of state constitutional
analysis,""'7 and that the Section grants "a property right that cannot
be taken away except under the police power of the State in the
paramount public interest."' 7 1
The cases recognize, however, that even though "the right to
earn a living must be regarded as inalienable" and "a law which
destroys the opportunity" to do so "by the erection of educational
and moral standards of fitness is legal grotesquery,"' 77 the right to
choose one's occupation is not absolute. In application, this standard
has essentially boiled down to rational basis review. As the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated in Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone,17 1 the
"constitutional protections" of article 1, section 1
have been consistently interpreted to permit the state, through
the exercise of its police power, to regulate economic
enterprises provided the regulation is rationally related to a
proper governmental purpose.... [The] [i]nquiry is thus
twofold: (1) is there a proper governmental purpose for the
statute, and (2) are the means chosen to effect that purpose
reasonable?'
174. JOHN LOCKE, OF PROPERTY (1679), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 303, 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (emphasis in original). The
conception of the right to choose one's occupation as a natural one is also influenced by
the interpretation of work as a manifestation of free will. Some historians, of course,
dispute the extent of Locke's influence on Jefferson generally and the Declaration in
particular. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE 169-75 (1978). This Article is not the place to revisit or re-litigate that
battle.
175. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cnty., 83 N.C. App. 345, 354, 350 S.E.2d 365, 371
(1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987); see also Cline v. McCullen, 148 N.C.
App. 147, 151, 557 S.E.2d 588, 591 (2001) (using the Treants court's interpretation of this
right to analyze an action for interference with business relations).
176. State v. McCleary, 65 N.C. App. 174, 180, 308 S.E.2d 883, 888 (1983).
177. State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940).
178. 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).
179. Id. at 64, 366 S.E.2d at 699.
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Despite this relatively deferential articulation of the standard,
though, cases analyzing challenges to occupational limitations made
under article I, section 1 have given meaningful review to the
government's claimed interests in justifying the limitation. For
example, in State v. Harris,'s a dry cleaner, J.P. Harris, was arrested
and convicted for practicing his trade without the license issued by
the State Dry Cleaners Commission and required by statute.'8 ' The
licensing statute granted the Dry Cleaners Commission the authority
to develop and implement an "examination to cover subjects deemed
necessary [by the Commission] to promote the public health, safety
and welfare of the people of the State of North Carolina." 8 1 The
Commission, composed of three members in the industry and two
members with no connection to the industry,"' closely tracked that of
the Auctioneers Licensing Board.'1" In defending the licensing
scheme, the State argued that the statute was intended to "empower
the Commission to apply standards of educational and moral fitness
to those who desire to choose and carry on the" occupation of dry
cleaning.'
The court found that the licensing scheme constituted a
"fundamental ... invasion of personal liberty and the freedom to
choose and pursue one of the ordinary harmless callings of life"
granted Harris by article I, section 1.186 In so doing, the court
characterized the statute before it as granting a "power of exclusion
of fellow workers in the same field" 87 by granting the Commission
the "unlimited discretion ... to set up standards of their own for
admission to the business ... according to whatever rules or
regulations they may conceive to be related to the 'public health,
safety, and welfare of the people.' "188 In affirming Harris's challenge,
the court distinguished between (i) the State's ability to "create[] and
enforce[] by laws" examination and licensing requirements for "those
desiring to engage in the learned professions, and in occupations
180. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
181. Id. at 748, 6 S.E.2d at 856.
182. Id. at 750, 6 S.E.2d at 857.
183. Id. at 749,6 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting Act of Feb. 11, 1937, ch. 30, § 2, 1937 N.C. Sess.
Laws 69, 70) ("The Commission consists of five members, 'three of whom shall have been
engaged in the dry cleaning, dyeing and/or pressing business in the State of North Carolina
for at least five years next preceding his appointment, and two of whom shall not be
connected with said business but shall be from the public at large.' ").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
185. Harris, 216 N.C. at 752, 6 S.E.2d at 859.
186. Id. at 753, 6 S.E.2d at 859.
187. Id. at 752, 6 S.E.2d at 859.
188. Id. at 754, 6 S.E.2d at 860.
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requiring scientific or technical knowledge and skill, some of which
bring about a relation of trust or confidence between those who
practice the trades or occupations and the clientele they serve"; and
(ii) those trades "[a]t the other end of the occupational scale": the
"ordinary trades and occupations, harmless in themselves, in many of
which men have engaged immemorially as a matter of common right,
as to which it is uniformly held that such standards may not be
applied."'8 9 "Somewhere between these extremes," the court stated,
"the slendering thread of police authority must come to an end, and
constitutional guaranties of personal liberty must supervene."190
Determining where police power ended and liberty began required a
close look at the occupation from which the State sought to exclude:
[R]egulation of a business or occupation under the police
power must be based on some distinguishing feature in the
business itself or the manner in which it is ordinarily conducted,
the natural and probable consequence of which, if unregulated,
is to produce substantial injury to the public peace, health, or
welfare.... [T]he power to regulate a business or occupation
does not necessarily include the power to exclude persons from
engaging in it.191
The court found that dry cleaning had no such distinguishing
features. Claims by the State that dry cleaning's use of allegedly
"inflammable liquids in the cleaning process" failed to justify
requiring an occupational entrance exam, since the use of such
material was "a matter more related to intelligence and prudence
than to education," and working with such liquids was not sufficient
to impose examination requirements on "filling station attendants,
cooks, and many others exposed to similar dangers."
More importantly for present purposes, as to the State's claim
that "the statute is justified as a measure intended to protect the
public against fraud," the court found that "there is no business or
occupation which is not likely to have its quota of dishonest men,"
and that "[t]he danger to the public comes from the character of the
man and not from any unusual opportunity afforded him in the
business." 93 "If occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the test," the
court held, "there is no reason why every grocer, every merchant,
every automobile dealer, every keeper of a garage, every
189. Id. at 756, 6 S.E.2d at 861.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 758-59, 6 S.E.2d at 863.
192. Id. at 760, 6 S.E.2d at 864.
193. Id. at 761, 6 S.E.2d at 864.
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manufacturer, and every mechanic who deals more frequently with
the public in general, and whose opportunities for fraud are far
greater than those of the real estate agent or salesman," may also be
subject to a licensure requirement. 9 4 As the court would state in a
later case, "[a] regulatory act justified only by reason of a desire to
protect the public against fraud and dishonesty may not be
sustained."' 95
Subsequent article I, section 1 cases applied Harris's
"professional"/"ordinary trade" distinction and affirmed its holding
that fraud deterrence is an insufficient public purpose to justify an
occupational licensing requirement in the face of an inalienable right
to choose one's vocation. For example, in the above-cited State v.
Ballance,19 6 the state supreme court overturned a conviction for
practicing photography without a license. 9 There, section 92-1 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina established a State Board of
Photographic Examiners and prohibited the practice of photography
without a license from the Board.198 The Board was empowered to
refuse licenses on moral and/or competency grounds, a delegation of
authority the court found "promote[d] a monopoly in what is
essentially a private business."l 99 The court in Ballance also expressly
rejected a fraud-based justification for the licensing requirement,
finding such reasoning to
run[] counter to the economic philosophy generally accepted in
this country that ordinarily the public is best served by the free
competition of free men in a free market.... [F]raud has been
practiced on occasion in all relations of life since the serpent
invaded Eden and misrepresented the qualities of the forbidden
fruit to the woman. 200
Similarly, in Roller v. Allen,201 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina enjoined the execution of a licensing scheme for tile and
marble installation which was to be implemented and enforced by the
North Carolina Licensing Board for Tile Contractors.20 2 As in Harris
194. Id.
195. State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 693, 114 S.E.2d. 660, 664 (1960).
196. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
197. Id. at 772, 51 S.E.2d at 736. In so doing, the court overturned its prior case
upholding the photographer license requirement, following the analogous decisions of
several other states. See id.
198. See id. at 766, 51 S.E.2d at 732.
199. Id. at 772, 51 S.E.2d at 736.
200. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736.
201. 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957).
202. See id. at 526, 96 S.E.2d at 859.
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and Ballance, the State provided a fraud-based justification for the
licensing requirement, arguing that "tile installing is a trade in which
it is easy to practice fraud upon the public by doing shoddy work and
that by policing the industry the public welfare will be promoted,"
but, also as in Harris and Ballance, the court rejected fraud as a basis
for licensure.20 3 In addition, the court took particular offense to the
Board's rejection of a license to the plaintiff for having failed his
written examination, noting that "[s]uccessful tile contracting consists
in doing the work rather than describing it in a written examination
paper," and that "in all probability the average worker could learn to
do acceptable tile work as quickly as he can learn to describe it on
paper. "204
2. "Professional"/"Ordinary Trade" Distinction as Applied to
Auctioneering
Given the "professional"/"ordinary trade" distinction, the cases
upholding licensing restrictions against article I, section 1 challenges
are predictable. They include challenges brought by unlicensed
attorneys, 205 barbers, 206 dentists, 207 physicians, 208 and surgeons. 209 The
203. Id. at 523, 96 S.E.2d at 857.
204. Id. at 522, 96 S.E.2d at 857.
205. See In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 15, 55 S.E. 635, 639-40 (1906).
206. See State v. Lockey, 198 N.C. 551, 555-56, 152 S.E. 693, 695 (1930).
207. See State v. Hicks, 143 N.C. 689, 693, 57 S.E. 441, 442-43 (1907).
208. See State v. Call, 121 N.C. 643, 645-46, 28 S.E. 517, 517 (1897); see also State v.
Siler, 169 N.C. 314, 318, 84 S.E. 1015, 1016-17 (1915) (upholding application of the law to
"all nondrug-giving practitioners," including chiropractors).
209. See State v. Van Doran, 109 N.C. 864, 868-69, 14 S.E. 32, 33 (1891). Real estate
seller/broker licensure statutes have also been found constitutional by most state supreme
courts, including North Carolina's. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 695-96, 114
S.E.2d 660, 665-66 (1960); State v. Polakow's Realty Experts, Inc., 10 So. 2d 461, 466-67
(Ala. 1942); Riley v. Chambers, 185 P. 855, 857 (Cal. 1919); State v. Spears, 259 P.2d 356,
363-64 (N.M. 1953). But these holdings are justified by concerns related to the
"professional" side of the "professional"/" ordinary trade" distinction, namely educational
requirements necessary for the valid conveyance of real property, in addition to
generalized fraud concerns. As the future Justice Cardozo explained in Roman v. Lobe:
Callings, it is said, there are so inveterate and basic, so elementary and innocent,
that they must be left open to all alike, whether virtuous or vicious. If this be
assumed, that of broker is not one of them. The intrinsic nature of the business
combines with practice and tradition to attest the need of regulation. The real
estate broker is brought by his calling into a relation of trust and confidence.
Constant are the opportunities by concealment and collusion to extract illicit gains.
We know from our judicial records that the opportunities have not been lost. With
temptation so aggressive, the dishonest or untrustworthy may not reasonably
complain if they are told to stand aside. Less obtrusive, but not negligible, are the
perils of incompetence. The safeguards against incompetence need not long detain
us, for they were added to the statute after the services were rendered. We recall
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court has not yet decided on which side of the
"professional"/"ordinary trade" line auctioneering falls. What is clear,
however, is that fraud alone, or even the potential for fraud, is not a
sufficient state interest to characterize a vocation as sufficiently
"professional" as to permit the State to bar entry.
Early cases from other jurisdictions recognized that the state
interest in regulating the practice of auctioneering is a weak one when
balanced against a state constitution-granted right to choose one's
occupation, and to the extent an interest actually existed, it was the
protectionist impulse of existing auctioneers to exclude new entrants.
In the 1884 case of City of Mankato v. Fowler,210 the Minnesota
Supreme Court recognized that "the business of an auctioneer is a
lawful and useful one, and there would seem to be no reasonable
warrant ... for exacting so large a sum as a license fee, the result of
which, it appears, is not to regulate but to suppress such business. "211
Similarly, in 1927's Balesh v. City of Hot Springs,212 the Arkansas
Supreme Court, relying on language from the state constitution
guaranteeing the same right to choose one's occupation as North
Carolina's article I, section 1, invalidated an ordinance making it a
misdemeanor to sell goods by auction within the city of Hot
Springs.2 13 And in 1869's Hayes v. City of Appleton,214 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court overturned a city ordinance that granted Appleton's
council the power "to regulate the time, place and manner of holding
them at this time for the light that they cast upon the Legislature's conception of
the mischief to be remedied. The broker should know his duty. To that end, he
should have "a general and fair understanding of the obligations between principal
and agent." Disloyalty may have its origin in ignorance as well as fraud. He should
know, so the Legislature has said, what is meant by a deed or a lease or a
mortgage. At any moment he may have to make report as to such matters to
expectant buyers or lessees. Often he goes farther, perhaps too far, and prepares a
memorandum of the contract. He is accredited by his calling in the minds of the
inexperienced or the ignorant with a knowledge greater than their own.
152 N.E. 461, 462-63 (N.Y. 1926) (internal citations omitted). Differences in value
between the sales of real property that occupy a real estate broker and the usual chattels
sold at auction also favor a finding that real estate seller/brokers are "professionals" for
purposes of article I, section 1. See Warren, 252 N.C. at 695, 114 S.E.2d at 665 ("Real
estate is one of the two great divisions of property rights, and bears as close a relation to
public peace and welfare in our civilization as any species of private rights.... There is
involved in the relation of real estate broker and client a measure of trust analogous to
that of an attorney at law to his client, or agent to his principal.").
210. 20 N.W. 361 (Minn. 1884).
211. Id. at 362.
212. 293 S.W. 14 (Ark. 1927).
213. Id. at 14-15 (citing ARK. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("[A]cquiring, possessing, and
protecting property" is an "inherent and inalienable right.")).
214. 24 Wis. 542 (1869),
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public auctions." 2 15 The court stated that "[t]he selling of property at
public auction [was] a lawful business," and it followed that, because
of its breadth and the inability of the city to articulate a justification
for it, the ordinance was "an unreasonable and unlawful interference
with the freedom of trade" and thus was "void."216
Though not directly addressing an auctioneer's license
requirement, early North Carolina law is consistent with the principle
that restraints on auctioneering are inherent limitations on trade, and
thus must be justified by a significant interest. For example, returning
to the tobacco auction context, in Gray v. Central Warehouse Co.,217
the Kinston Board of Trade barred plaintiff George Gray from
membership and, therefore, from bidding at its members' warehouse
auctions, because it alleged that Gray had nested tobacco as a
grower.218 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
association could not exclude Gray from participation due to his lack
of membership.2 19 In so doing, the court analogized a tobacco
warehouse's function to that of a "common carrier[]," and found that
once a warehouseman holds a public sale, "[h]e can no more refuse to
sell the tobacco of the producer at auction, or deny the right of any to
bid when offered, than the owner of a stage or steamboat line may
decline to take passengers."220 Running a warehouse was a public
function subject to nondiscrimination, the court held, because
[t]here is no subject in which the protection of the producers
against extortion and combinations to reduce prices is more
important.... [T]o permit discrimination would be to place this
great agricultural industry in the absolute power of any
combination, which, by reducing the number of buyers and
215. Id. at 543, 545.
216. Id. at 545; see also State ex rel. Cook v. Bates, 112 N.W. 67, 68 (Minn. 1907)
(upholding a city ordinance barring the auctioning of jewelry and watches because "such
special sales are liable to be attended with great abuses, and to result in cheating and
defrauding the unsophisticated, which is not the case with the general business of an
auctioneer" (emphasis added)). The United States Supreme Court's sole foray into the
legality of auctioneer licensing occurred in Toyota v. Territory of Hawaii, where a
Honolulu-based auctioneer argued that Hawaii's discrimination in requiring a $600 fee for
auction licenses in Honolulu but only $15 for other districts denied the auctioneer equal
protection of the law. 226 U.S. 184, 190 (1912). The Court found that a state's power "to
decide upon the amount of fees to be charged ... must have a wide range of discretion
[and] is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary." Id. at 191-92 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
217. 181 N.C. 166, 106 S.E. 657 (1921).
218. Id. at 169, 106 S.E. at 658.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 170, 106 S.E. at 659.
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admitting only those acceptable to great combinations, would
place the producers of tobacco at their mercy.221
Similarly, in Kinston Tobacco Board of Trade v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 222 the court rejected the same Board of Trade's attempt
to require the defendant to bid at an end-of-season auction under
terms and conditions established by the Board, finding that the
Board's demand "str[uck] at the heart of our system of free
enterprise." 223
Though this reasoning may at first glance appear to support
regulation of auctioneers, the court in Gray and Liggett & Myers
understood that barriers to entry, even if intended to protect auction
participants from frauds, are essentially anticompetitive-and that
discrimination on the basis of industry-determined ethics and
standards favored buyers over sellers. As the Gray court noted:
Should any seller or buyer misconduct himself as by fake sales
or fake purchases or otherwise, his conduct is a matter to be
settled by prosecution for disorderly conduct or other
misdemeanor in the courts.... To permit [the warehouseman
to prohibit said seller or buyer from participating in auctions]
would be to lay wide open the road to the exercise of an undue
restriction upon trade, which, always forbidden by the common
law, is now indictable under both State and Federal laws.224
3. Auctioneers as "Professionals"? The Professional Malpractice
Cases
Since neither the Supreme Court of North Carolina nor the
North Carolina Court of Appeals has answered the question within
the context of article I, section 1, it may be arguable whether
auctioneers are "professionals" for constitutional law purposes. But
courts have considered this question in the context of the Law itself,
in particular whether it provides the basis for a professional
malpractice claim or any other private right of action. Thus far, the
answer has been no.
In Thomas, Lord of Shalford v. Shelley's Jewelry, Inc.,225 the
Western District of North Carolina noted, in response to a plaintiff's
claim that an auctioneer's negligence constituted professional
malpractice, that it had "found no North Carolina case recognizing a
221. Id. at 172, 178, 106 S.E. at 660, 663.
222. 235 N.C. 737, 71 S.E.2d 21 (1952).
223. Id. at 740, 71 S.E.2d at 24.
224. 181 N.C. at 176, 106 S.E. at 662.
225. 127 F. Supp. 2d 779 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
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cause of action for auctioneer malpractice," and that such a claim is
properly grounded in common law tort.226 In so finding, the court
stated that "[d]espite the fact that auctioneers are required by statute
to be licensed in North Carolina," it could not "conclude [that] their
services fall within the realm of professional services, such as those
performed by physicians, attorneys, architects, and others who
achieve their status by virtue of long and often arduous educations
and apprenticeships. Nor has the [court] found any other state which
recognizes auctioneers as a profession." 2 27
In rejecting the professional malpractice claim against
auctioneers, the Thomas, Lord of Shalford court defined
"professional" as an occupation "involving specialized knowledge,
labor, or skill." 228 This definition aligns closely to the definition of
professional in the Harris case, which, as previously discussed, was
concerned with determining when an occupation crosses the line into
"professional" such that the State may exercise its police power over
the occupation and require licensure.2 29 In the Harris case, the court
defined professional occupations as being those "requiring scientific
or technical knowledge and skill, some of which bring about a relation
of trust or confidence between those who practice the trades or
occupations and the clientele they serve. "23
Thus, to the extent auctioneering falls on the "ordinary" side of
the "professional"/"ordinary trade" distinction for the reasons stated
above and in Thomas, Lord of Shalford, it would seem that a license
requirement likely runs afoul of article I, section 1. Though
auctioneers are unlike photographers or tile-layers in that they make
a market for others' goods rather than sell work of their own, the
ability to advertise goods and set prices (in collaboration with
bidders) provides no greater opportunity for fraud, and likely
provides far fewer opportunities for fraud, than those available to a
craftsman establishing his own value for the goods or services he
personally provides. The auctioneer actually sells speech, not goods.
And, as demonstrated by the artistry of "Chillie" Langhorne and the
thousands of other auctioneers who came along in his wake,2 the
speech being sold is inherently expressive, and barring prospective
226. Id. at 786.
227. Id.
228. See id. (quoting Taylor v. Vencor, 136 N.C. App. 528, 530, 525 S.E.2d 201, 203
(2000)).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 180-94.
230. State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940).
231. See supra notes 39-41, 47-49.
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auctioneers from the profession thus raises another constitutional
concern-this time under the First Amendment.
B. Auction Calling as Protected Expressive Activity
Auctioneering's status as what I would call an "expressive
occupation" raises free speech-related concerns with a licensing
requirement of the type imposed by the North Carolina statute. As
demonstrated in Part I, tobacco auctioneers were as much advertisers
as sellers, and the auctioneer's exercise of creative judgment about
the kind of bid-soliciting activity to which bidders will respond
continues today. In addition, the auctioneer was hired not simply to
sell, but also to speak. This also remains true today. Commercial
speech-related case law demonstrates that this type of activity,
whether characterized as speech-for-hire or as promoting or
facilitating a transaction between a buyer and seller, is inherently
expressive, and thus deserving of protection under the First
Amendment's Speech Clause.23 2
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
commercial speech soliciting a transaction is protected, so long as the
speech "concerns lawful activities and is not misleading"; such speech
may only be banned or regulated if doing so "directly advance[s] a
substantial governmental interest," and the ban is "appropriately
tailored to that purpose. "233 As to tailoring, the Court has held that "if
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the
restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and
means is reasonable." 234 And the Court has found that outright bans
of marketing-related commercial speech are not appropriately
tailored. For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 a statute prohibiting advertising
the prices of prescription drugs was both content-based and
insufficiently tailored." A statute that, in effect, barred the
communication of "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y
232. Cf Daniel A. Farber, Afterword: Property and Free Speech, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
1239, 1256 (1999) (noting that a tax on tobacco advertising "raises special constitutional
concerns, since the basis for the tax would be expressive conduct").
233. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 485 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Conun'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980)).
234. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993).
235. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
236. Id. at 761-62.
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price"237 "single[d] out speech of a particular content and s[ought] to
prevent its dissemination completely." 2 38 Similarly, a local ordinance
forbidding the display of "for sale" signs239 and a statute prohibiting
the advertisement of contraceptives 2* were both struck down, even
though in both cases the barred speech at issue was proposing a
transaction.
There is no speech-related barrier to criminalizing fraud ex post,
since such speech is intended to mislead; the problem only arises
when, as here, a licensing requirement is imposed on speech ex ante in
order to prevent a possible fraud from happening. Since "state rules
that are designed to prevent the 'potential for deception and
confusion [in transactions] may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the' perceived evil,"241 it seems clear that
criminalizing the calling of auctions without a license, particularly
when the sole justification for the proscription is to protect buyers
from potential fraud, should be constitutionally suspect under the
First Amendment. Without a state grant of approval, a prospective
auctioneer is barred from calling auctions at all. And as discussed in
more detail in Part IV, several less restrictive alternatives to outright
bans on auctioneering without a license exist that would interfere less
with speech.242
The United States Supreme Court has looked skeptically upon
bars on marketing-related speech for nominally fraud-protective
purposes. For example, in the recently decided Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.,243 the United States Supreme Court struck down on First
Amendment grounds a Vermont statute that barred pharmaceutical
marketers from using prescription-related information for the
"marketing or promoting [of] a prescription drug, unless the
prescriber consents."2" The Court found that the statute at issue
"impose[d] burdens that are based on the content of speech and that
are aimed at a particular viewpoint," and thus higher judicial scrutiny
was warranted.245 Similarly, in United States v. Caronia,2" the Second
237. Id. at 761.
238. Id. at 771.
239. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1977).
240. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
241. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191, 203 (1982)).
242. See infra Part IV.C; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the deterrence effect of
criminal laws against fraud in lieu of bans on auctioneering without a license).
243. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
244. Id. at 2660 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d)).
245. Id. at 2663-64.
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Circuit found that a statute punishing a criminal defendant for
marketing and promoting "off-label" pharmaceutical uses violated
the defendant's First Amendment rights because, by criminalizing a
certain type of marketing-related speech, the statute discriminated
against speech on the basis of its content.247 Under the statute at issue
in Caronia, off-label marketing-which often occurred in face-to-face
encounters between pharmaceutical sales representatives and
healthcare providers-was a misdemeanor, as is calling an unlicensed
auction under the Law. 248 Furthermore, the Court also held in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council249 that even speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction" is protected by the First Amendment;250 this
rule has been applied to a range of marketing- and advertising-related
speech, including the "information on [a] beer label"2 51 or a credit
report.252 Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, lower courts
have deemed that speech proposing transactions such as car sales is
entitled to constitutional protection.253 Applying the Court's logic
from Sorrell, if auctioneering affects bidding decisions, it does so
because bidders "find it persuasive. "254 A prior restraint on such
speech in the form of a licensing requirement-or worse, a power to
enjoin speech if the Board believes an unlicensed auction is about to
take place-thus implicates the First Amendment's guarantees.
Indeed, it may well be the case that calling an auction may not be
commercial speech at all. In a challenge to the District of Columbia's
tour guide licensing scheme, the D.C. District Court distinguished
commercial "speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction" from "speech carried in a form that is sold for profit,"
246. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
247. Id. at 168-69.
248. Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(1) (2006) (making misbranding of a
pharmaceutical drug a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 andlor
imprisonment for up to one year), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 85B-4(a), 85B-9(a) (2011)
(requiring auctioneers to possess an auctioneering license and noting that "[any person,
corporation or association of persons violating [this requirement] shall be guilty of a Class
1 misdemeanor").
249. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
250. Id. at 776.
251. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995).
252. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62
(1985).
253. See, e.g., Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766,779 (6th Cir. 2007).
254. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) ("If pharmaceutical
marketing affects treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive. Absent
circumstances far from those presented here, the fear that speech might persuade provides
no lawful basis for quieting it.").
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which is not commercial speech at all."5 Where "the speech is the
substance of the transaction"-i.e., where the speaker is being paid to
speak-the speaker's own First Amendment rights are implicated.2 56
As the Eighth Circuit also noted in a challenge to a law prohibiting
fortunetelling for profit:
The speech itself, fortunetelling, is not commercial simply
because someone pays for it. The speech covered by the
ordinance, for the most part, does not simply propose a
commercial transaction. Rather, it is the transaction. The
speech itself is what the "client" is paying for. ... There is a
distinct difference between the offer to tell a fortune ("I'll tell
your fortune for twenty dollars."), which is commercial speech,
and the actual telling of the fortune ("I see in your future
. ."), which is not.5
Similarly for present purposes, the difference is between (i)
advertising oneself as an auctioneer, or even advertising an auction,
which would be commercial speech, and (ii) calling an auction for
commission, which would arguably not be.
It is true that even after finding speech subjected to licensing
requirements as "more than commercial speech," the D.C. District
Court found the tour guide licensing requirement as content-neutral
and upheld the regulation under intermediate scrutiny.258 But it did so
because the regulations at issue were "triggered by the conduct: the
guiding or directing of a sightseeing trip or tour," rather than any
speech offered to paying customers in the course of that tour.259 The
effect on speech was thus incidental, because a tour guide was
required to be licensed "whether they choose to speak or not.""
Similarly, the licensing restriction at issue was narrowly tailored
because, inter alia, it left "ample alternatives for communication"-
i.e., aspiring tour guides could still provide tourists information, but
255. Edwards v. D.C., 765 F. Supp. 2d 3, 13 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
256. Id.
257. Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998).
258. Edwards, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
259. Id. at 15.
260. Id. at 17. Another restriction on tour guides, this one imposed by the Department
of the Interior and applicable to the national parks, was justified on the ground that
"regulation ... of business conducted on national park grounds" was a substantial
governmental interest. Wash. Tour Guides Ass'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 808 F. Supp. 877, 880
(D.D.C. 1992). "[P]reventing commercial exploitation of park visitors" by fraudulent tour
guides was only one aspect of that interest; the others were preserving the parks and
"ensur[ing] pleasurable experiences for those who visit" there. Id. at 880-81. Thus, the
government's interest as a landowner and operator, as well as any claims to consumer
fraud protection, justified the exclusion.
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could not "conduct[] their tours for profit." 261 A license as a
mandatory prerequisite to auction calling, by contrast, is aimed
directly at speech rather than conduct, and as mentioned above, it
leaves no alternative for unlicensed individuals who choose to express
themselves (and earn profit) by calling auctions.262
In addition, there is little doubt that the threat of prosecution
under the licensing statute chills First Amendment rights. As the
Fourth Circuit recently stated in upholding a challenge to North
Carolina's dietician licensing statute, where a "non-moribund statute
facially restricts expressive activity" by an unlicensed practitioner of
the occupation with which the statute is concerned, a First
Amendment injury has occurred."
It is also true that some licensing and like restrictions have been
upheld against First Amendment challenges. For example, in Locke v.
Shore,2" the Eleventh Circuit held that the Speech Clause did not bar
Florida from requiring licensure for interior designers working for
nonresidential commercial clients.265 The court there found that
"[t]here is a difference, for First Amendment purposes, between
regulating professionals' speech to the public at large versus their
direct, personalized speech with clients," and since the licensing
statute "regulate[d] solely the latter," it implicated no First
Amendment interest.26 6 But the inhibition on speech was permissible
because it was "merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise
legitimate regulation."267 Similarly, in Accountant's Society of Virginia
v. Bowman,268 a group of non-CPA accountants challenged a Virginia
statute that barred unlicensed accountants from using a range of
standards-based terms such as "generally accepted accounting
standards" and "audit report." 269 The Fourth Circuit upheld the
statute on the ground that it restricted "only accountants'
communications with and on behalf of their clients, as a means of
261. Edwards, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
262. Cf Walker v. Flitton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 503, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (stating that where
a state occupational board "deign[ed] to prohibit all solicitation or contract by unlicensed
individuals, leaving no other alternative for unlicensed [practitioners] ... to engage in
commercial speech in this area," the board's licensing requirement was not narrowly
tailored to serve the governmental interest asserted).
263. Cooksey v. Futurell, No. 12-2084, 2013 WL 3215240, at *22 (4th Cir. June 27,
2013) (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1999)).
264. 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011).
265. Id. at 1191.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 860 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1988).
269. Id. at 603.
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regulating the professional activities of non-CPAs," and thus the
statute was "the permissible regulation of a profession, not an
abridgement of speech." 27 0 In the case of licensing auctioneering,
however, the effects on speech can hardly be said to be incidental. In
Florida and Virginia, respectively, interior decoration and
accountancy were still permissible occupations even if the statutes at
issue in Locke and Bowman were presumed to be valid. Auctioneers
do not simply provide advice to sellers on the value of goods; they are
market-makers. And making a market requires communicating not
just to one's clients, but to the public at large-prospective buyers, as
well as actual ones.
Relatedly, courts have consistently invalidated statutes that
impose prior restraints on in-person solicitations.2 7 1 In many ways,
these solicitations, at least when conducted door-to-door, are akin to
the face-to-face sales at most auctions. In-person solicitations, such as
the solicitation of donations by religious groups, are usually analyzed
as non-commercial speech.272 But as discussed above, the line
between commercial and non-commercial solicitation is hardly clear,
and that line is rarely respected when the government seeks to ban
the speech in question. For example, in the recent Comite De
Jornaleros De Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,273 the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, invalidated an ordinance 274 that barred
individuals from standing near or on a street and soliciting
employment or business from passing motorists. 275 Although the labor
organizations petitioning the court for relief did not claim that the
statute only implicated commercial speech, and the Ninth Circuit's
decision was not based on existing commercial speech precedent,276
270. Id. at 605.
271. See, e.g., Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2012)
(invalidating a municipal ordinance that banned door-to-door solicitation between 6 p.m.
and 9 a.m. on First Amendment grounds).
272. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)
("[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests-communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and
ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First
Amendment.... Canvassers in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for
money. Furthermore, because charitable solicitation does more than inform private
economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a
variety of purely commercial speech.").
273. 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
274. REDONDO BEACH, CAL. MUN. CODE § 3-7.1601(a) (1989), http://www.qcode.us
/codes/redondobeach/view.php?topic=3-7-16-3_7_1601&frames=off.
275. Comite De Jornaleros De Redono Beach, 657 F.3d at 940.
276. See id. at 945 n.2.
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the court nonetheless found that the ordinance did not survive First
Amendment scrutiny.277 It is certainly good for speech that the door-
to-door solicitation cases seem to have retained the protective patina
of the neighborhood proselytizer plaintiff, even if the anti-solicitation
statutes analyzed in those cases are intentionally aimed at commercial
conduct, such as the one in Redondo Beach. But it also seems clear
that even under commercial speech-like intermediate scrutiny,
regulations criminalizing speech are suspect. A State "cannot totally
ban speech," even speech characterized as commercial, "if its goal is
to prevent dissemination of false and/or misleading information."278
Recognizing First Amendment protection for commercial
solicitation would not grant every salesman a potential constitutional
claim for alleged government interferences with his sales pitches
(though it is undisputed that door-to-door canvassing is
constitutionally protected, even if the canvasser is more Willy Loman
than Charles Taze Russell).279 Rather, it would affirm that a licensing
requirement targeted at a particular form of speech-especially one
which provides for criminal penalties in the event of noncompliance
with the Law-should be subjected to meaningful scrutiny before
being used to bar an individual from engaging in an expressive
occupation. 28 0 The state's belief that an auctioneer might make the
277. Id. at 940.
278. Walker v. Flitton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 503, 520 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (citing Shapero v. Ky.
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
279. See Project 80s, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). The Project
80s court discussed a four-prong test for determining when an ordinance can be said to
"impermissibly burden[] commercial speech." Id. The first prong under this test is that the
speech sought to be protected "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. at
637 n.4. Thus, if a salesman's commercial speech does not satisfy this prong, he may not be
said to have a constitutional claim for alleged government inferences. Charles Taze
Russell was a Pennsylvania pastor and a forefather of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Hollis W.
Barber, Religious Liberty v. Police Power: Jehovah's Witnesses, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 226,
226 (1947). The Witnesses, of course, brought several First Amendment cases in the
United States Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s, one of the most famous of which was
Cantwell v. Connecticut, which affirmed the First Amendment's protection of door-to-door
religious solicitation. See 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) ("We find in the instant case no assault
or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no
personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to
buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, however misguided
others may think him, conceived to be true religion."). Willy Loman is the famous title
character in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman. ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A
SALESMAN, in ARTHUR MILLER'S COLLEcTED PLAYS 130 (1957).
280. See Project 80s, Inc., 942 F.2d at 637. Here, the court struck down ordinances
barring door-to-door solicitation after finding that the City did not "affirmatively prove
that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve substantial government interests." Id.
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purchaser of a good more susceptible to fraud cannot justify making
the unlicensed calling of an auction a crime punishable by four
months in prison. As the Court also stated in Sorrell, "[t]hat the State
finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech
or to burden its messengers."28 '
IV. THE NECESSITY OF THE AUCTIONEER LICENSING STATUTE
Even though the legality of the licensing statute is questionable,
perhaps one could argue that the utility of the licensing statute
nevertheless justifies retaining it. However, as demonstrated below,
this is not so. Self-regulation, existing criminal law proscriptions, and
common law alternatives provide more than adequate protection for
consumers.
A. Self-Regulation Against Fraud: A Look at Auction Theory
1. Economic Auction Theory
To best understand the potential efficacy of self-regulation as
opposed to regulation by the State against fraud in auction markets, a
(mercifully) brief review of auction theory may be helpful. In short,
auction theory confirms the premise that where the buyers have the
right to inspect the object for sale, all parties involved, including
auctioneers, already have the incentive by virtue of an auction's
structure to provide truthful information concerning the objects up
for bid. This is as true in modern auctions as it was in the loose-leaf
tobacco barns of the early 1900s.
Most auctions falling within the bailiwick of occupational
licensing schemes involve "English" ascending-bid auctions, whereby
the sale price of an object is successively raised (by bidders as
facilitated by the seller's auctioneer, for present purposes) "until only
one bidder remains, and that bidder wins the object at the final
price."282 It bears retaining in mind two points: (1) in the absence of a
reserve price, it is bidders, not sellers or even auctioneers, who
establish prices in ascending-bid auctions; and (2) each bidder's
maximum bid is based on the bidder's own valuation of the auctioned
object. 283 Auction theory literature refers to this latter valuation
281. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
282. PAUL KLEMPERER, AUcrIoNS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11 (2004).
283. Id. at 11, 13.
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process and the knowledge the bidder uses to arrive at it as "private
information"; any difference between the bidder's private
information and his winning (or final) bid is known as the bidder's
surplus or profit. 21 The final price paid for the object thus reflects
each bidder's private information, since through bids, each bidder's
valuation has been publicly signaled to every other bidder during the
auction call. 285 And if there happen to be asymmetries in private
information, a bidder with an informational advantage will likely
either (1) bid more aggressively, if the advantage would result in a
higher personal surplus, or (2) drop out, if the advantage would result
in a lower one. 286 In either case, the sale price contemplates and
incorporates those asymmetries as well. In other words, "the sale
price converge[s] to the true value" of the object, "fully aggregating
all of the economy's information even though each bidder has only
partial information. "287
Moreover, even if one assumes an imperfect auction-derived
object valuation based on asymmetrical information, such an
undervaluation is not perpetual. Rather, it will eventually correct,
because even when bidders "have disparate prior beliefs about the
value of the object being sold, well-functioning resale markets and
durability of the object will ensure a common ex post valuation." 28
For the same reasons, the seller has incentives to "pre-commit to
revealing ... honestly" any valuation information he may have
concerning the auctioned object.289 The sharing of that information
raises expected revenue by providing additional information that
bidders can use to form their private valuations leading up to and
during the bidding process; thus "the seller benefits by establishing a
284. Id. at 13, 21. Different auction theory scholars refer to the bidder's reservation
value, the maximum price the bidder is willing to pay based on private information, and
the bid, which is the publicly declared price the bidder is willing to pay, and call the
difference between bid and reservation value the bidder's expected utility or gain. See
Mamata Jenamani, Yuhui Zhong, & Bharat Bhargava, Cheating in Online Auction-
Towards Explaining the Popularity of English Auction, 6 ELEC. COM. RES. &
APPLICATIONS 53, 55 (2007).
285. See KLEMPERER, supra note 282, at 13.
286. See id. at 23; see also Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions
and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1104 (1982) ("When there are three
or more bidders, ... the bidding behavior of those who drop out early in an English
auction can convey information to those who keep bidding....").
287. KLEMPERER, supra note 282, at 27 (emphasis added).
288. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, Collusion in Auctions, 15/16 ANNALES
D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 218, 219 (1989). So to the extent the price I pay for a
lamp at auction reflects numerous uncertainties as to its value, it is unlikely that all of
those uncertainties will be passed on to every subsequent buyer of the lamp.
289. KLEMPERER, supra note 282, at 21.
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policy of complete disclosure of his information."290 The seller
"reveals honestly" through his fiduciary, the auctioneer.291
What happens, then, in the case of seller fraud in the form of
knowing misrepresentations that the auctioneer relays to bidders
concerning the auction goods? In order for such a misrepresentation
to have a significant effect on the object's final sale price, it would
have to effectively cancel out almost any independently obtained or
developed private information in the internal valuation of every
bidder.
To illustrate why, imagine an auction with three Bidders, A, B,
and C, all of whom have inspected the object for sale. Assume
Auctioneer has knowingly misrepresented the auctioned object, the
Lamp, as an Original with value n. In fact, the Lamp is a
Reproduction with value n - 1. Bidder A, who knows that the Lamp
is a Reproduction, will rationally bid for the Lamp only up to n - 1, or
more likely to some value short of n - 1 if Bidder A wants to obtain a
surplus. Once the bids go above n - 1, however, Bidder A exits the
auction.2 92 This will result in Bidder B or C winning the Lamp with a
bid very likely less than their own personal misvaluations based on
the misrepresentation, because auction theory shows that a bidder's
exit from the auction decreases the aggressiveness of the remaining
bidders' bidding activity, and thus results in lower winning bids.293 A
bidder who observes more bidders bidding at or near the same value
grows more confident in his own valuation and grows less afraid of
the possibility that he may have overestimated in coming to that
valuation; conversely, fewer bidders results in less aggressive bidding.
This also means that even if Bidders B and C ignore Bidder A's bid
activity and continue to bid for the Lamp believing it to be an
Original based on Auctioneer's misrepresentation, the sale price will
nevertheless still be lower due to Bidder A's exit. The boards of trade
during the tobacco auction era, as well as the auctioneers themselves,
290. Milgrom & Weber, supra note 286, at 1114; see also KLEMPERER, supra note 282,
at 21.
291. There is one caveat: auction theory finds that for purposes of increasing profit, a
seller's resources are best spent adding additional bidders. See KLEMPERER, supra note
282, at 27.
292. Cf Robert E. Clark and Larry J. Halford, Going ... Going ... Gone: Some
Preliminary Observations on "Deals" at Auctions, 7 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 285, 288
(1978) (quoting a buyer as stating, "If I can buy [the auctioned item] reasonable, okay
[whereas] if it goes too high, then I quit, or if I don't know its value I don't even bid").
293. See, e.g., Lance Branman, J. Douglass Klein, & Leonard W. Weiss, The Price
Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets, 69 REv. ECON. & STAT. 24, 24 (1987)
("Auction theory predicts that an increased number of bidders increases winning bids.").
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fully recognized this principle. 294 Therefore, by passing along value-
related misrepresentations, the Auctioneer significantly increases the
risk of losing bidders with accurate private information, as is the case
here-and therefore drives down his own price by reducing his bid
pool. 295 The Auctioneer's chances of profiting from his
misrepresentation thus decrease whenever any bidder has private
information concerning actual value and bids based on that
information.296
And what if the auctioneer and/or seller enlist puffers to drive up
bids during the auction call? Again, the structure of ascending-bid
auctions minimizes the potential harm. The current bid for the object
includes a part of the total information concerning value, but this is
only one part. Since private information sets the value of the bidder's
surplus and establishes the scope of other bidders' participation in the
auction as price rises, rational bidders with better private information
will generally stop bidding rather than follow a puffer's fraudulent
bids all the way to an inflated value for the object. Though it is true
that puffer misrepresentations can also add to the object's valuation if
actual bidders rely on them, harms attributable to puffer-related
frauds are inherently limited.
2. Sociological Auction Theory
Sociological analysis of the interaction between auctioneer and
bidders confirms the conclusions of economic auction theory.
According to this literature, auction mechanisms "rely upon a social
organization-common assumptions, beliefs, understandings and
communities of practice-that underpin the structure and integrity of
the process." 297 In order for an auction to serve its function as a
294. See Bright Belt Warehouse Ass'n v. Tobacco Planters Warehouse, 231 N.C. 142,
144, 56 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1949) (stating that according to a board of trade regulations, "an
essential element of a bona fide sale of tobacco at auction is that there shall be assigned to
such sale an adequate set of buyers prepared to bid at the competitive sale," with
"adequate set of buyers" meaning buyers representing "each of the three major domestic
tobacco companies" and "[b]uyers of at least three other recognized companies
purchasing tobacco for export").
295. See KLEMPERER, supra note 282, at 21 ("If the seller has access to any private
source of information, her optimal policy is to pre-commit to revealing it honestly. The
general principle that expected revenue is raised by linking the winner's payment to
information that is affiliated with the winner's information, is known as the Linkage
Principle.").
296. Of course, Bidder A may not bid at all based on his private information
concerning the Lamp's actual value. But this scenario also results in a likely winning bid
short of n, for the same reasons discussed above.
297. Christian Heath & Paul Luff, Ordering Competition: The Interactional
Accomplishment of the Sale of Art and Antiques at Auction, 58 BRIT. J. Soc. 63,65 (2007).
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legitimate mechanism for establishing a price and exchange system
for a good whose precise value might be uncertain, the auction's
participants must view the bidding process as a fair and transparent
one. Bidders must affirmatively believe in the "neutrality of the
auctioneer and auction house, and the integrity of bids"-more
precisely, that bids are real and "represent[] actual demand."29 8
Necessary to this belief is the presumed integrity of the calling of the
auction by the auctioneer; participants must assume that the bids that
the auctioneer recognizes "are indeed genuine contributions from
more than one potential buyer and represent actual competition for
the goods in question." 299
Think back to the genial Ed Pace from Part I above, "one of the
best, widest awake, and most active tobacco warehouse managers in
the whole country,"3" or to the "[i]ndependent," uncorrupted H.B.
Montague of Richmond. 0 It is critical to the auction process that
bidders view the auctioneer as independent. If an auctioneer
intentionally misvalues a good or lot for bid, either sua sponte or at
the instruction of the good's owner, two things will likely happen: (i)
bidders with accurate private information will leave the auction,
resulting in a lower final bid;3 02 and (ii) those spectators who may not
be bidding on the particular good or lot will question the legitimacy of
the valuation of other goods that will come up for bid, which will also
result in a lower overall take for the good's owner.3 0 Prospective
bidders, repeat players, and even nonbidding audience members play
298. Id. at 64.
299. Id. at 72.
300. See Johnston, supra note 54.
301. See supra text accompanying note 29.
302. See supra Part IV.A.1.
303. Heath & Luff, supra note 297, at 72. As Heath and Luff state:
[I]t is important to note the public and visible character of sales and the ways in
which the escalation of price and the final sale of goods is undertaken in the
presence of others, many of whom do not have a particular interest in any specific
lot in question. The conduct of the auctioneer is critical in this regard, not just in
establishing a run with a rising incremental sale, but in demonstrating the integrity
of bids and the legitimacy of the value that the goods achieve.
Id. The fluidity between the roles of auctioneer and bidder is an important deterrent as
well. See Orley Ashenfelter, How Auctions Work for Wine and Art, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 1989, at 23, 25 ("[I]nventing fictitious bids above the reserve price is certainly
unethical and probably illegal, too. Since the auctioneer's rules are known to an entire
array of personnel who often move on to become bidders or their agents, it would soon
become common knowledge if an auction house systematically engaged in the generation
of fictitious bids above the reserve price. No auction house that values its reputation-and
the long run profits its reputation secures-would systematically engage in this practice.").
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a critical role in ensuring fair and transparent valuations, since their
conversations among themselves, along with actual bidders, are a
"means of monitoring interest levels and probable prices for
particular items at the sale and, at the same time, keeping alert for
opportunities to acquire or dispose of merchandise outside the
auction setting."3 0 This market-within-a-market informs price-setting
and private information, and encourages auctioneers to keep it
honest.3 05 And though these structural protections may rely on
regulars in the auction market more so than first-timers, the novice
bidder benefits from these various social pressures in the form of
more accurate valuations and less fraud in bid-calling. 6
For these reasons, less restrictive options that build upon the
need for auctioneers to be seen as fair can be effectively used to help
prevent frauds. The profession of auctioneering already uses a range
of voluntary accreditation designations for auctioneers; these signals
are indicia of trustworthiness to prospective sellers and bidders.o'
BuySafe, mentioned earlier, provides similar indicia for ecommerce
sites.108 If buyers and prospective sellers can decide for themselves
which auctioneers are most trustworthy, and accreditation can assist
in that process, then a licensing requirement adds little more to the
process except an opportunity for industry protectionism.
Finally, and relatedly, there is the potential problem of
conspiracy among bidders. Though bidder-side fraud is not the harm
304. Robert Jarvenpa, Collective Witnessing: Performance, Drama, and Circulation of
Valuables in the Rural Auction and Antiques Trade, 32 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 555,
571 (2003).
305. See id. at 571-72. Contract law plays a role here as well. In most contracts, "sellers
are forbidden by contract with the auctioneer from bidding in the auction. This is the
protection that the auctioneer offers to the prospective buyers to ensure that they are not
being artificially 'bid up.' " Ashenfelter, supra note 303, at 25; see also U.C.C. § 2-328(4)
(2012).
306. See supra Part IV.A.1.
307. See, e.g., Education - Professional Auctioneering Designations, Certified
Auctioneer Institute (CAI), NAT'L AUCTIONEERS ASS'N, http://www.auctioneers.org
/designations/cai (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). State-level auctioneering associations also
exist and encourage the public to utilize their member lists to locate "professional"
auctioneers. See AUCTIONEERS Ass'N OF N.C., http://northcarolinaauctioneers.org/ (last
visited Aug. 19, 2013) ("To find a qualified professional auctioneer, click on our AANC
membership list."); see also COUNCIL OF AFFILIATED STATE AUCTIONEERS ASS'NS,
http://auctionassociations.org/members/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (listing state-level
associations).
308. See What is buySAFE?, BUYSAFE BLOG (Aug. 3, 2009), http://blog.buysafe.com
/buysafeblog/2009/08/what-is-buysafe.html ("The buySAFE Seal provides an explicit 3'
party endorsement of a merchant's quality and reliability, thereby eliminating consumer
uncertainty. The buySAFE Seal reassures shoppers that the business behind the website is
stable, reliable, trustworthy and able to deliver on the promises made.").
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an auctioneer licensing statute is intended to remedy, it is worthwhile
to note that ascending-bid auctions constrain bidder collusion as well.
A collusive agreement in such an auction requires "the bidders [in a
cartel to] agree [in advance] that the designated winner bid an
arbitrarily small amount, while all the others bid zero, and all the
others then have a substantial incentive to cheat on the agreement."309
Once a bidder cheats on the agreement, the cartel "cannot react
instantaneously" to the cheat because "it is impossible to react to a
[cartel] defector's bid if the bid occurs just before the auction shuts
down."310 The remaining members of the cartel thus "must instead
rely on expulsion threats or other future retaliatory measures," which
will bear little if any relevance to the sale price of the item currently
up for bid.3 1' Tobacco buyers may have colluded on loose-leaf prices
over fish fries in motel parking lots in the days of the warehouse
auction, but the payoff for such collusion was a limited one.
B. The Deterrence Effect of Criminal Fraud in the Auction Context
As previously demonstrated, regulating commercial conduct ex
ante through a licensing requirement, even to deter frauds that
potentially may occur during the course of that conduct, raises
meaningful liberty-based concerns.312 Licensing as a mechanism for
reducing fraud bars a wide range of lawful conduct. Fortunately,
however, no one disputes that the State's police power permits it to
deter such frauds in a more targeted fashion: outlawing the frauds
themselves.
Notably, in light of Part I, the Auctioneers' Law exempts loose-
leaf tobacco auctions from its licensing requirement." No legislative
history explains the exemption. However, the Law justifies the
exemption by referencing another statute's governance over loose-
leaf auctions, i.e. Chapter 106, Article 40 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina, which was initially passed in 1933.314 There, the
protections against seller frauds discussed in Part I and developed
309. KLEMPERER, supra note 282, at 28.
310. Hendricks & Porter, supra note 288, at 223.
311. Id. at 222-23. Moreover, the opportunity for self-help against the cheater is always
an option since "the designated winner can immediately respond to any unanticipated bid,
by remaining in the auction." Id.
312. See supra Part III.B.
313. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-2(a)(6) (2011).
314. Id. § 85B-2(a) ("This Chapter shall apply to all auctions held in this State except
... (6) Leaf tobacco sales conducted in accordance with the provision of Chapter 106 of
the General Statutes."). Chapter 106, Article 40 was first adopted in 1933. See Act of May
12, 1933, ch. 467,1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 815.
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over time were expressly codified. For example, it is unlawful to
"nest" tobacco on a warehouse floor such that "it is impossible for the
buyer thereof to pull leaves from the bottom of such pile for the
purpose of inspection"315 ; to "shingle" tobacco, i.e., arrange "a pile of
tobacco that a better quality of tobacco appears upon the outside and
tobacco of inferior quality appears on the inside of such pile"316; and
to "overhang" tobacco, i.e., arrange "a pile of tobacco" that
"alternate[s] bundles of good and sorry tobacco."317 Chapter 106,
Article 40 also makes it illegal to call an auction "in the name" of
anyone other than its "true owner," who must register with the selling
warehouse.318 Violating any of these provisions is a Class 3
misdemeanor.319 In addition, Chapter 106, Article 40 establishes the
rights of warehousemen and purchasers to establish boards of trade
such as those discussed above, which are formed to "make reasonable
rules and regulations for the economical and efficient handling of the
sale of leaf tobacco at auction."320
The fact that historical right-to-inspect-related self-regulatory
protections in tobacco auctions were codified might lead one to
conclude that market mechanisms were (and are) insufficient to
protect buyers from auction-related frauds. But the opposite
conclusion is just as easily reached: the legislature's codification of
those protections actually affirms the market-based protections
developed there. The legislature's exclusion of tobacco auctioneering
from the Law's licensing requirement because of Chapter 106, Article
40's protections is at least a tacit admission that where buyers are
protected from misrepresentations of value via criminal fraud law, a
licensing requirement is not necessary. In addition, the State could
draft specific criminal statutes barring fraud in calling auctions of any
type, similar to those set out in Chapter 106,321 that would supplement
North Carolina's general criminal false pretenses statute, which
would also apply to any fraudulent conduct by an auctioneer or
seller.3 22 And as discussed below, common law fraud and unfair trade
practices law impose the same obligations on other sellers in auction
315. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-461(1).
316. Id. § 106-461(2).
317. Id. § 106-461(3).
318. Id. § 106-462.
319. Id. § 106-464.
320. Id. § 106-465.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
322. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993)
("[Tihe State may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without
further justification.").
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markets that Chapter 106, Article 40 imposes on tobacco sellers,
though not with the same specificity.
A legislature could codify a specific inspection right and specific
anti-fraud protections in all types of auctions, but doing so would not
resolve the question raised here: if these protections are available or
fraud-related harms are mitigated by law and/or market custom, then
what explains the necessity of the additional "protection" provided by
an auctioneer licensing requirement? So long as the essential
protections of a neutral third-party seller, a meaningful right to
inspect,3 23 and post-sale recourse are prevalent in a particular market,
then those protections should be sufficient, whether their presence is
attributed to law, culture, or both. Where speech or a right to earn a
living are concerned, ex post remedies are always preferable to ex ante
restrictions.
C. Alternative Remedies for Buyers
If the Law is, as I conclude, legally questionable, one might next
ask whether its necessity nonetheless compels a vigorous defense of
it, even if auctions carry inherent bidder-side protections as reviewed
in Parts I and III.A. But for nearly as long as goods have been
auctioned, wronged buyers, sellers, and even auctioneers have availed
themselves of common law remedies to undo fraudulent sales, win
compensation from negligent auctioneers, or otherwise make
themselves whole. The Law's alleged purpose is to protect bidders; it
turns out, however, that thanks to tort and contract law, those bidders
do not need the protections the State deems it necessary to provide.
323. Courts have long recognized the capacity for self-inspection to deter frauds in
auctions. See, e.g., Biddles, Inc. v. Enright, 146 N.E. 625, 627 (N.Y. 1925) (upholding a
New York statute that required most auctions for goods to be held during daylight hours,
because "[t]he practice of selling goods by auction at night, when their qualities could not
be accurately distinguished [by prospective bidders], had frequently resulted in the unwary
being imposed upon, and great frauds committed"). In the absence of such harms,
however, such restrictions can themselves be found unconstitutional, as was the case in
People v. Gibbs:
Auctioneering, honestly conducted, is a business within the legitimate scope of
trade, traffic or merchandizing. When by ordinance all fraud and
misrepresentation in effecting sales and when all questionable methods of
attracting attention or conducting sales, which are recognized as likely to develop
in that special line of business, and which may tend to public annoyance,
imposition, and disturbance of public peace and safety of a community, have been
guarded against and prohibited, further restriction extends beyond the fair scope
of powers granted to regulate for the protection of society.
152 N.W. 1053, 1055 (Mich. 1915).
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The structure of auctions deters fraud, but that of course does
not mean that they have always been fraud-free. Historical materials
on the law of auctions make clear that common law tort causes of
action have long been used for parties wronged by fraud or other
misconduct during an auction.
For example, in his 1818 Treatise on The Law of Principal and
Agent, and of Sales By Auction, Samuel Livermore noted that English
law recognized the rule that "an auctioneer is personally liable to an
action for the recovery of the deposit money at the suit of the bidder,
provided a good title [to the auctioned property] cannot be made."324
In the case Livermore cited, the English court deemed that because
the relevant title defect was a "circumstance which ought to have
been disclosed at the time of bidding," the winning bidder was
entitled to a return of his £50 deposit from the auctioneer, who was "a
mere depository ... [who] ought not to have parted" with the deposit
until the sale was completed and any clouds on the title were clear.325
Actions in conversion by third parties against auctioneers for selling
property in which the third party rather than the seller had title have
a similarly long pedigree; in Livermore's words, "[i]f an auctioneer
employed to sell any property, has notice that what he is about to sell
is not his principal's, and he yet continues to sell, he is personally
liable in an action for the produce of the sale." 326 Both tort and
contract law provided a remedy for auctioneer misrepresentations
concerning the condition or other attributes of auctioned goods; if an
auctioneer's "misdescription be wilful [sic] and designed, it amounts
to a fraud; and fraud, upon general principles of law, renders a
contract voidable."327 As Nokes wrote, "statements made by the
324. 2 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
AND OF SALES BY AUCTION 314 (1818).
325. Id. at 314-15.
326. Id. at 317. In the cited case, an auctioneer had sold 260 chaldrons of soil after the
soil's owner became bankrupt and the sheriff sold the soil in execution of the bankruptcy.
Id. The auctioneer "did not communicate to the bidders that there was a dispute
respecting the title to the soil." Id. A similar case rejected a theory that an auctioneer
could not be sued in tort for such a sale on the ground that the auctioneer was "only an
agent employed by the [seller] to sell; and that therefore the action should have been
brought against the [sellers]," who were principals. Id. at 318; see also G. D. NOKES, AN
OUTLINE OF THE LAW RELATING TO SALES BY AUCTION 119 (1925) ("[T]he auctioneer
may be personally liable, and may be sued . .. for conversion, as when he resells goods
purchased at the auction to a person other than the original purchaser.").
327. JOSEPH BATEMAN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AUCTIONS; WITH
FORMS AND DIRECTIONS TO AUCTIONEERS 51 (1883).
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auctioneer may form part of the contract of sale ... a breach of which
gives the purchaser a right to rescind the contract.""
Similarly, English courts acknowledged that puffing constitutes
actionable fraud that will, inter alia, relieve the "winning" bidder of
his obligation to pay. As Livermore noted:
If the owner of an estate, or of goods, put up to sale by auction,
employ puffers to bid for him, it is a fraud on the real bidders,
and the highest bidder cannot be compelled to complete the
contract.... [In an auction,] the public are brought together
upon a confidence that the articles set up to sale will be
disposed of to the highest real bidder[;] [t]hat could never be
the case, if the owner might secretly and privately enhance the
price by a person employed for that purpose; ... It is a fraud
upon the sale and upon the public.329
A sale in which the auctioneer pretended to see bids where no
bidder has signaled-or as Nokes called it, "trotting"-could also be
voided on fraud-related grounds.3
At common law, bidders were also protected from sellers who
sought to claim that their goods had never been for sale, despite the
fact that the auctioneer's sale for such goods had already closed. As
the New York's highest court held in finding such a seller had been
estopped from challenging the sale, if
the true owner holds out another, or allows him to appear, as
the owner of, or as having full power of disposition over the
property, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing
with such apparent owner, they will be protected.... In the
words of Lord Ellenborough, uttered more than a century ago,
"if one send goods to an auction-room, can it be supposed that
he sent them thither merely for safe custody?"331
Accordingly, courts respected a bona fide sale by an auctioneer
as a matter of course, which would serve to deter goods' owners from
challenging those sales after the fact.
Relatedly, and consistent with the discussion of criminal frauds in
the General Statutes of North Carolina above,332 the criminal law also
historically protected buyers against bid-rigging schemes. As G.D.
328. NOKES, supra note 326, at 63-64.
329. LIVERMORE, supra note 324, at 335, 337-38.
330. NOKES, supra note 326, at 74.
331. Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 111 N.E.2d 871, 875-76 (N.Y. 1953).
332. See supra Part IV.B.
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Nokes noted in his 1925 Outline of the Law Relating to Sales By
Auction:
When an auctioneer enters into an agreement with a number of
persons, who have no intention of buying, that they shall bid for
the purpose of causing a purchaser to buy property at a grossly
excessive price, all the parties to the agreement to hold such a
mock auction may be indicted for the common law offence of
conspiracy.333
Wronged auctioneers could also avail themselves of common law
remedies via tort claims against fraudulent buyers. Livermore's 1818
treatise noted the historical right of an auctioneer to bring an action
in tort against a buyer who failed to pay for the auctioned goods on
the theory that the buyer defrauded the auctioneer of his
commission.334 A judge in the English case quoted by Livermore
found that "an auctioneer has a possession, coupled with an interest,
in goods in which he is employed to sell," and the auctioneer's claim
was not barred merely because the sale was for a third party's goods
"on the premises of [the goods'] owner."3
An auctioneer's fiduciary duty to his seller obligated the
auctioneer/agent to "use due diligence and skill in the performance of
his duties." 6 As Nokes wrote,
when a person holds himself out as willing to act for reward as
an auctioneer, the principal who employs him so to act is
entitled to expect that the auctioneer will act in the
performance of his duties with necessary diligence and skill; and
if he fails to so act he may be held liable in damages to his
principal for negligence [and also] if the auctioneer acts
fraudulently.3 7
333. NOKES, supra note 326, at 75. This principle was also recognized by equity courts
in the United States. See, e.g., Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 153 (1850) (citing numerous
state court cases for the proposition that "by-bidding or puffing by the owner, or caused by
the owner, or ratified by him, has often been held to be a fraud [on the bidder] and avoids
the sale."). This opinion from the Veazie case also notes that it does not "lessen the injury
or fraud if the by-bidding be by the auctioneer himself." Id. at 154.
334. LIVERMORE, supra note 324, at 312.
335. Id.; see also NOKES, supra note 326, at 10 ("[W]hen goods are sent to an
auctioneer for sale by the owner, the latter remains the owner until the goods are sold, but
before sale the auctioneer has possession [and thus] what is called a special property in
them .... ").
336. NOKES, supra note 326, at 20.
337. Id.
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Turning back to North Carolina,. in the 1800s, our courts also
recognized the common law's built-in protections against frauds in
auctions. In 1829, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted that
[a] sale at auction is a sale to the best bidder, its object a fair
price, its means competition. Any agreement, therefore, to stifle
competition, is a fraud upon the principles on which the sale is
founded. It not only vitiates the contract between the parties, so
that they can claim nothing from each other, but also any
purchase made under it, their claims against the vendor being
weaker than those against each other-policy alone forbidding
that the last mentioned should be enforced, but both policy and
justice uniting to condemn the former.33 8
Likewise, in the 1826 case of Morehead v. Hunt,339 the defendants
had advertised several lots of land in Rockingham County that were
to be sold at auction, stating that the lots had "immediately in [their]
vicinity an inexhaustible bank of pit coal, an extensive quarry of
excellent slate, and a number of excellent sites for mills and other
water works."3 40 Plaintiffs not only claimed post-sale that these
representations were untrue, but also that the defendants used
"puffers" to inflate the prices paid at auction.3 4 1 The court found that
both the advertising-related misrepresentations made by the
defendants and the puffery engineered by their auctioneers called for
setting aside the sale.342
The state's cases also recognize that a critical aspect of common
law protection from fraud is the same privilege that tobacco buyers
fought for years to win-the right to self-inspect the goods to be sold.
For example, in the 1848 case of McNeely v. Hart,3 43 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina granted the appellant a new trial for
conversion against an auctioneer when the items sold at auction were
not present at the time of sale and "[t]he bidders could not at the
moment see them, nor examine their quality and value, and of course
were invited to bid in ignorance of these essential particulars."3 " The
court found that an auction
[m]ust be conducted in such manner, that every person, who
may come up be fore [sic] the articles are knocked down by the
338. Smith v. Greenlee, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 126,128 (1829).
339. 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 35 (1826).
340. Id. at 35.
341. Id. at 36.
342. Id. at 35.
343. 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 492 (1848).
344. Id. at 494.
[Vol. 911946
2013] N.C. AUCTIONEERING STATUTE 1947
auctioneer, may see and examine them, so as to enable him to
become a bidder if he choose. To hold otherwise would be to
give some of the persons present an advantage over others, and
thus prevent that fair and open competition, which the law so
much desires in sales of this kind.345
Because the facts in evidence were not clear as to whether the
auctioned goods were available for inspection, the court remanded
for a new trial.3 46
Accordingly, as set out by these authorities, parties have
historically availed themselves of the courts to redress auction-related
wrongs.3 47 To be sure, however, governments have imposed statutory
requirements on prospective auctioneers for nearly as long as the
common law has recognized fraud actions against them. The United
Kingdom's Auctioneers Act of 1845 obliged "[e]very Person who
exercises or carries on the Trade or Business of an Auctioneer ... [to]
be required to take out [the] License as by this Act directed."3 48 But
this requirement was to ensure the collection of excise taxes rather
345. Id.
346. This principle merely extends the common law fraud rule that where "the
purchaser has full opportunity to make pertinent inquiries but fails to do so through no
artifice or inducement of the seller, an action in fraud will not lie." Libby Hill Seafood
Rests., Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App. 695, 698, 303 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1983). The failure-to-
inspect rule has been understood to apply to fraud claims brought by bidders against
auctioneers. Greene v. Rogers Realty & Auction Co., 159 N.C. App. 665, 670, 586 S.E.2d
278, 281 (2003) (rejecting a bidder's claim against auctioneer as "analogous to that of
buyers that fail to inspect the property before purchasing it"). For similar reasons, North
Carolina products liability law grants immunity to the sellers of products who lacked the
opportunity to inspect those products for defects. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(a) (2011).
347. Also relevant but not addressed in detail here is potential redress for defrauded
buyers under North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("NCUDTPA"), which provides an action for damages for "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in .. . commerce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a). Relevant to the article 1, section
1 "professional"!" ordinary trade" discussion supra Part III.A.1-2, the NCUDTPA
immunizes "learned professionals" from claims arising from their rendering of
"professional services." Id. § 75-1.1(b). No auctioneer sued under the NCUDTPA has won
immunity from suit under the "professional services" exception.
348. The Auctioneers Act of 1845, reprinted in NOKES, supra note 326, at 128. The Act
also required an auctioneer,
before beginning any auction, [to] affix or suspend ... a Ticket or Board
containing his true and full Christian and Surname and Residence painted,
printed, or written in large Letters publicly visible and legible in some conspicuous
Part of the Room or Place where the Auction is held, so that all Persons may read
the same.
Id. at 129.
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than to regulate entry into the profession.34 9 As one 1883 treatise
interpreting the Auctioneers Act noted, "the object of the legislature
in requiring auctioneers to be licensed is to recruit the revenue, and
not to protect the public"; accordingly, "it [is] left to the public to
decide upon the fitness of the parties licensed" to "carr[y] on the
business of an auctioneer.""'o In addition, the licensing function was
performed not by a licensing board made up of auctioneers, but
rather by "the commissioners of inland revenue."35 1 The Act even
assisted a bidder in need of asserting his rights by requiring an
auctioneer to display his full "Christian name, surname, and residence
in large letters on a ticket or board affixed or suspended in a
conspicuous part of the room or place where the sale is held."35 2 This
transparency enabled wronged bidders to assert their rights against
fleeting, often itinerant auctioneers in the event of a contestable sale.
As in the loose-leaf auction example, and as evidenced a century-and-
a-half later by the popularity of seller ratings on eBay, transparency
was the best antidote to potential frauds.
CONCLUSION
The tobacco auctioneer, seller, and bidder, by negotiating and
collaborating, regulated the auction system themselves. The self-
correcting nature of the loose-leaf warehouse auction market was not
an anomaly, but rather typical of how many auctions operate even
today. Protections such as the bidder's right to inspect prior to sale
and the auctioneer's twin desires to protect his reputation as a fair
dealer, as well as to keep as many prospective buyers bidding as
possible, deter fraudulent conduct. And even new auction markets
have developed their own fraud-deterring practices, such as seller
ratings and bond-based guarantees for buyers. In addition, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that a desire to protect the
public from frauds is an invalid justification, standing alone, to
support an occupational restriction imposed by the State.
Despite all this, it may be the case that buyers in auction markets
need greater protection from fraud than tort, contract, and self-
regulation provide, particularly if, for example, the good being
auctioned is quite perishable, which would deprive a buyer the ability
to mitigate his damages via resale, or if first-time bidders or sellers in
349. See BATEMAN, supra note 327, at 11. ("It is still, however, necessary that any one
acting as an auctioneer should be provided with an excise license.").
350. Id. at 12, 15.
351. Id. at 18.
352. Id. at 24; see also NOKES, supra note 326, at 129.
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a particular type of auction are prevalent. But the answer to such a
problem is voluntary accreditation, not state-imposed barriers to
entry. An accreditation from an established association can signal to
prospective sellers and buyers that an auctioneer is qualified and
trustworthy, to the extent those qualities require additional assurance
in some contexts beyond the auctioneer's own word. And the
converse is true as well; a bidder may purchase from a non-accredited
auctioneer, but he does so at his own risk, and as noted, he is always
free to sue either the auctioneer or the seller, or both, if he learns
later that the nature or quality goods bought were misrepresented
during the sale.
Occupational licensing is not per se protectionism in disguise. But
for such a law to stand, it must be both legal and necessary.
Otherwise, the State's police power has extended its reach past the
boundaries set by individual liberty. It is not likely the case that if the
North Carolina Auctioneering Law and other similar laws were
repealed, then the number of wronged bidders would multiply
exponentially; after all, eBay does not appear to be a breeding ground
for fraud. But as the Supreme Court of North Carolina said in State v.
Harris,"' the "danger to the public" raised by fraud "comes from the
character of the man," not the nature of his occupation.354 Barring a
state interest of the highest order, even men of allegedly dubious
character have the right to choose their respective trades.
353. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
354. Id. at 761, 6 S.E.2d at 864.
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